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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

PERCEPTIONS OF FAIRNESS AND POLITICAL SUPPORT IN THE FACE OF
ECONOMIC INEQUALITY
In this dissertation, I investigate two key questions: 1) What are the specific
conditions under which economic inequality undermines democratic legitimacy; and 2)
How does inequality map onto individuals’ perceptions of fairness and subsequently
affect satisfaction with democracy and trust in political institutions? I first argue that
individuals’ perceptions of distributive unfairness are key factors whereby economic
inequality undermines democratic legitimacy. Inequality - and subsequent perceptions
that the economic distribution is unfair - undermine political support by signaling that the
democratic process is not functioning properly and by challenging people’s normative
expectations about what democracy should do in practice.
I next draw from a diverse literature on social and political psychology, as well as
governance quality, to derive new hypotheses about how people form their fairness
judgments and use them to evaluate democracy. Right-leaning and upper-class
individuals should be less upset with inequality in the first place, but even when these
individuals perceive distributive unfairness, they should be less likely to express political
dissatisfaction as a result. Additionally, the context in which individuals form their
fairness perceptions should condition the relationship between fairness judgments and
political support. In a context of good governance, individuals should be less likely to
perceive inequality as unfair, and subsequently less likely to express political
dissatisfaction for any perceived distributive unfairness in society. Governance quality
provides alternative evidence that democracy is in fact functioning properly and should
allay citizens’ concerns about inequality and distributive unfairness, at least when it
comes to evaluating democratic legitimacy.
To test my theory and hypotheses, I take a mixed-methods approach that
combines large-N analysis of public opinion data and original survey experiments. To
contextualize my quantitative results, I draw on motivating examples from original openended surveys, newspapers, and elite interviews. In the first empirical chapter, I conduct
a multilevel analysis of data from 18 Latin American and show that perceptions of
distributive unfairness are negatively correlated with trust in government and satisfaction
with democracy, yet good governance significantly mitigates this negative relationship.
In the second empirical chapter, I use original survey experiments in Argentina, Mexico,
and the US to show that perceptions of distributive unfairness are key causal factors

linking inequality to political dissatisfaction. In the third empirical chapter, I use a second
set of survey experiments to investigate how governance quality moderates the
relationship between inequality and political support. When individuals are presented
with information about declining corruption, they are less likely to perceive their
country’s income distribution as unfair, and less likely to link inequality to political
dissatisfaction.
KEYWORDS: Inequality, Distributive Fairness, Satisfaction with Democracy, Trust in
Government, Corruption, Latin America
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
1.1

Motivation
The Americas host the highest levels of economic inequality in the world.

Extreme levels of inequality challenge some of the core principles of democracy, such as
“one person, one vote” by giving wealthy citizens undue political influence (Gilens
2012). High levels of inequality moreover pose serious challenges for the deepening and
strengthening of democracy in regions such as the Americas. Not only does economic
inequality challenge societal and democratic norms about equality of opportunity for all
citizens, but it challenges citizens’ normative expectations about the outcomes that
democracy is supposed to produce (Singh and Carlin 2015). In this dissertation, I
investigate the specific conditions under which economic inequality erodes support for
democratic institutions. In particular, I ask how do individuals’ fairness judgments affect
satisfaction with democracy and trust in political institutions?
Prior research has demonstrated a robust empirical correlation between high
levels of economic inequality and low levels of political support, such as support for
democracy (Córdova and Seligson 2010; Krieckhaus et al. 2014), satisfaction with
democracy (Anderson and Singer 2008); and political trust (Zmerli and Castillo 2015).
Yet, our understanding of the relationship between these concepts remains incomplete.
First, this research does not establish a causal mechanism linking inequality to
evaluations of democracy. It is unclear, for instance, whether citizens blame the
government for economic inequality, or which groups of citizens dislike inequality the
most. It is also unclear how the quality of democratic procedures in a country – e.g., the
extent of corruption – affects the relationship between economic inequality and citizens’
1

evaluations of the political system. My dissertation seeks to fill these scholarly voids by
examining the conditions under which economic inequality leads to political
dissatisfaction.

1.2

Democratic Stability and the Sources of Political Legitimacy
Democratic consolidation depends of the legitimacy of democratic government,

and upon democracy becoming “the only game in town” for both masses and elites (Linz
and Stepan 1996). In everyday language, we often think of legitimacy as the recognition
that a political authority has the right to rule, or more generally as “citizen support for the
government” (Booth and Seligson 2009, 8). Easton (1975, 451) defines legitimacy as
“the conviction that it is right and proper…to accept and obey the authorities and abide
by the requirements of the regime” (451), and extant literature argues that legitimacy, or
political support, is important for citizen acquiescence, especially with regard to policies
and political outcomes that people disagree with (Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence 2005;
Tankebe 2013; Tyler 2004).
Despite its importance, however, public opinion data suggests that political
support, such as trust in government and satisfaction with democracy, is at troubling low
levels throughout the Americas. As Figure 1.1 illustrates, citizens in Mexico, Peru, El
Salvador, and Brazil exhibit troubling low levels of trust in government – around 20
percent indicating that they trust the government “some” or “a lot” – compared to citizens
in countries such as Uruguay or the Dominican Republic who exhibit higher levels of
political support. Likewise, less than a quarter of respondents in Mexico and Brazil
indicated in the 2015 Latinobarometer survey that they are satisfied with the way

2

democracy functions in their country. Granted, there is also substantial variation in these
measures of political support across the region. Citizens in Uruguay, for instance,
express overwhelming trust in government and satisfaction with democracy.
Nevertheless, the low levels of political support observed in a number of these countries
raise important questions about the democratic stability and the widespread “democratic
buy in” that is vital for democracy to consolidate (Linz and Stepan 1996).
Figure 1.1 Support for the Political System in Latin America

Source: 2015 Latinobarometer. Figures represent the percentage of respondents in each country
indicating at least some positive amount of trust in government or satisfaction with democracy.

In addition to citizens expressing general mistrust of and dissatisfaction with
democratic institutions, a number of countries in the region are experiencing crises of
representation (Mainwaring 2006), party system collapses (Morgan 2011; Tanaka 2006);
and the rise of undemocratic populist leaders (Mayorga 2006). In Brazil, for instance,
recent high-profile corruption scandals coupled with a severe economic recession and
rising poverty and inequality have left citizens disillusioned with their democratic
institutions. 1 In 2018, amid this growing dissatisfaction with democracy, Brazilian

1 https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/in-brazil-nostalgia-grows-forthe-dictatorship--not-the-brutality-but-the-law-and-order/2018/03/14/bc58ded2-1cdd11e8-98f5-ceecfa8741b6_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.c7fe0436d084
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citizens turned to the far-right populist Jair Bolsonaro in the presidential election.
Bolsonaro has expressed hostility toward civil rights and liberties, especially concerning
indigenous and LGBT communities. He has even praised Brazil’s brutal military
dictatorship and indicated that in an effort to combat crime, Brazilian police should be
given immunity to kill suspected criminals (Phillips 2018).
Scholars have grappled to understand why mass support for political institutions
is so low in a number of countries throughout the Americas. Dissatisfaction with
democracy has been linked to poor economic performance (Booth and Seligson 2009;
Dalton 2004), majoritarian electoral systems (Anderson and Guillory 1997; Cho and
Bratton 2006), and election scandals (Kumlin and Esaisson 2012). A growing body of
literature further argues that poor governance and weak state capacity have resulted in a
“crisis of representation,” characterized by widespread disillusionment and
disenchantment with democratic institutions (e.g., Mainwaring 2006), in a number of
Latin American countries. Indeed, poor governance quality – i.e., a lack of impartiality
in the exercise of political authority (Rothstein and Teorell 2008) – is associated with
decreased satisfaction not only in Latin America (Weitz-Shapiro 2008), but in new and
mature democracies more generally (Anderson and Tverdova 2003).
In this dissertation, I investigate another important factor that prior research has
linked to low levels of trust in the national government and satisfaction with democracy:
economic inequality (Anderson and Singer 2008; Zmerli and Castillo 2015).
Specifically, I argue that citizens’ perceptions of the income distribution are key factors
whereby inequalities in society translate into political dissatisfaction. Individuals are
generally less satisfied when democratic outcomes do not match their normative
4

expectations about what democracy should do in practice (Singh and Carlin 2015). When
citizens perceive or experience distributive unfairness – for example, when they perceive
their country’s income distribution as unfair – this signals that the democratic process is
not producing the outcomes it was intended to produce (Meltzer and Richards 1981).
I also argue that the way in which economic inequality maps onto individuals’
perceptions of distributive unfairness and subsequent political evaluations depends upon
individual-level factors such as political ideology and class-status, as well as the context
of governance quality in a country. Although I expect that all individuals should, on
average, be less likely to support their democratic institutions when they perceive
distributive unfairness in society, this negative relationship should be weaker among
upper-class individuals and those on the right of the political spectrum. Additionally, I
argue that good governance should mitigate the negative influence of perceived
distributive unfairness on support for the political system.
To test my theory, I rely on a mixed-methods approach that combines multilevel
analyses of large-N, cross-national survey data, as well as original survey experiments
from Argentina, Mexico, and the United States. I also draw on motivating examples
from newspapers and elite interviews in Argentina, as well as original qualitative survey
data from the U.S., to contextualize the quantitative results from my cross-national
analyses and survey experiments.

1.3

Why the Americas?
In terms of income inequality, Latin America is the most unequal region in the

entire world (Lopez-Calva and Lustig 2010). Moreover, the three most unequal OECD
5

countries are in the Americas: Chile comes in first, followed by Mexico and the United
States. Today, most countries in the Americas are democracies, but many countries in
the region face a number of challenges with democratic consolidation. Particularly, I
argue that the high levels of inequality in this region compromise both political support
and the quality of democratic representation. Amid rising poverty, inequality, and
violence in Mexico, for instance, voters reinstated the PRI in 2012, thus returning the
party that undemocratically dominated Mexican politics for most of the 20th century.
The Americas can be thought of an ideal case to test the above theory and
hypotheses. The first empirical chapter of this dissertation employs a large-N crossnational analysis of 18 Latin American countries, and the remaining two empirical
chapters focus on the United States, Mexico, and Argentina. In many ways, this choice
of three countries can be thought of as approximating a “most similar” research design, or
a case selection technique that results in two or more cases that are similar on specified
variables other than the outcome variable and key explanatory variables of interest (Mill
1872; Seawright and Gerring 2008). Seawright and Gerring (2008) explain that most
similar cases that are broadly representative of the population and provide the strongest
basis for generalization. From a simplified perspective, these cases can be thought of as
“most similar” in that background factors such as actual levels of inequality are similar,
yet there is significant variation on both beliefs about the government’s role in the
economy – especially when it comes to addressing inequality – and support for the
political system.
As Figure 1.2 shows, the United States and Argentina have similar levels of
satisfaction with the way democracy works in each country, while Mexicans are
6

Figure 1.2 Public Opinion in Mexico, Argentina, and the United States

Source: Latin American Public Opinion Project’s (LAPOP) 2014 AmericasBarometer

generally less satisfied with the way their democracy works in practice. Meanwhile,
Figure 1.2 shows that Mexican and Argentine citizens believe that the government should
play a much heavier role in addressing inequality, compared to citizens in the United
States. Citizens in Mexico and Argentina also express some of the strongest preferences
in Latin American for statist economic policies, such as those that reduce inequality,
ensure citizens’ economic and social wellbeing, and place important industries in state
hands (Carnes and Lupu 2015). In many ways, this key difference makes the United
States a hard test of my theory: if US citizens do not believe that the government should

7

address inequality, then it is less likely that these individuals will see inequality as unfair
and/or blame the government for inequality and distributive unfairness.
In Chapter 2, I develop hypotheses that an individual’s political ideology should
condition the relationship between perceptions of inequality and fairness, and political
support. Specifically, I theorize that left-leaning individuals are more likely to moralize
unjust outcomes and are less likely to rely on legitimizing stereotypes that justify
inequality, and hence should be more likely to blame the government for distributive
unfairness. A typical component of left-right ideological placement is economic
preferences. The classic understanding, based on ideological cleavages that formed the
basis for party systems in Europe, is that people on the Left prefer more government
involvement in the economy, whereas people on the Right prefer less. In some Latin
American countries, however, economic preferences do not map onto ideological
identification so clearly. In fact, economic preferences only predict left-right placement
in 10 of the 18 Latin American countries and in Honduras, statist economic preferences
predict Right self-placement, rather than Left (Zechmeister 2015). However, the
relationship between economic preferences and political ideology is more or less similar
in Mexico, Argentina, and the United States. Thus, these three cases are ideal for testing
hypotheses derived from arguments about left-right semantics around individuals’
economic preference.
In many ways, Argentina and the U.S. are ideal cases for testing my theory. First,
Argentina and the United States have very similar levels of income inequality (as
measured by the Gini coefficient), although I expect significant variation in citizens’
perceptions of the fairness of the income distribution. According to the most recent
8

World Bank figures, the U.S. has a Gini Index 41.06, and Argentina has an index of 42.7.
Although these Gini figures are high by worldwide standards, they are some of the lower
figures in the Americas. Despite these common levels of inequality, however, there are
theoretically important differences between the two countries. First, as mentioned above,
the two countries have very different social norms about what role the government should
play in the economy. This is important because it allows me to hold economic inequality
relatively constant while leveraging significant variation in citizens’ normative
expectations about the outcomes that democracy is supposed to produce. In the United
States, public opinion data show that a majority of US respondents recognize that
inequality in increasing, yet they do not agree on how to address it (McCall and
Kenworthy 2009; Pew 2014). For instance, Pew’s 2014 report shows that less than half
of all Americans believe that government aid to the poor does more harm than good.
Meanwhile, the majority of citizens in Argentina believe the government should play a
heavy role in the economy, such as addressing inequality (Lupu 2016). Therefore,
Argentine citizens should be more likely than those in the US to expect the government
to address inequality, and more likely to attribute blame for inequality to the government.
Argentina is also an ideal case for testing my expectations that right-leaning and
upper-class citizens should be less likely to blame the government to economic
inequalities and distributive unfairness in society. In Argentina, class is the dominant
social cleavage (Lupu and Stokes 2009). Moreover, Argentina is relatively homogeneous
country, and hence class cleavages are not as confounded by racial and ethnic divides as
they are in the United States and Mexico. Finally, public opinion about inequality is

9

much more polarized along class lines in Argentina than in the United States (Blofield
and Luna 2011).
Mexico is another ideal setting to test my theory and hypotheses. Mexico was a
front-runner among Latin American governments trying to address poverty and inequality
through conditional cash transfer programs, but Mexicans are very dissatisfied with the
way democracy works in their country. More than three-quarters of Mexican respondents
in the 2014 AmericasBarometer (Figure 1.2) indicated some level of agreement that the
government should enact firm policies to reduce inequality. Thus, individuals in Mexico,
just like individuals in Argentina, should be more likely than individuals in the US to
blame the government for inequality. Like the US, however, Mexico also presents an
opportunity for another hard test of my theory and hypothesis, especially using
experiments that rely on manipulating people perceptions of fairness. First, class is not
the dominant cleavage in Mexico, as it is often confounded with race and ethnicity.
Furthermore, the baseline for political support is already low in Mexico. Democracy
under 12 years of PAN leadership failed to deliver the economic promises Mexicans were
hoping for and following a contested election in 2006 that left the country bitterly
divided, drug-related violence spiked.
In 2012, Mexico reinstalled the PRI to power, yet high hopes for change and
reform under President Peña Nieto quickly faded: poverty and inequality are increasing
and the government’s record regarding human rights, press freedom, and transparency is
abysmal (Flores-Macías 2016). Also, despite pledges to rein in corruption, the PRI
government is at best unable to deliver, and most likely, the president’s inner circle is
part of the problem (Flores-Macías 2016, 70). In another instance of electoral volatility
10

common through the region, Mexican citizens elected the populist leftist leader Andrés
Manuel López Obrador as president in 2018. AMLO and his new MORENA party rose
to power making a number of grand promises, such as combatting corruption and lifting
Mexicans out of poverty, but it remains unlikely that this “mandate” will become a
political reality.
Given the generally poor quality of governance in Mexico (high corruption,
arbitrary violence by state actors, lack of rule of law) it may be harder than in the US or
Argentina to manipulate people’s perceptions of fairness in experiments—i.e., to make
people believe that inequality is a fair distributive outcome. As I elaborate in the next
chapter, an implication of Fairness Heuristic Theory suggests people substitute judgments
about governance quality and procedural justice for judgments about distributive fairness
when deciding whether or not they can trust the authorities (van den Bos, Lind, and
Wilke 2001; van den Bos, Wilke, and Lind 1998; Van Ryzin 2011). Hence, people’s
daily experiences with procedural injustice may outweigh any new information they
encounter about distributive fairness.

1.4

Overview of the Dissertation
In Chapter 2, I develop my theoretical argument and lay out a series of four testable

implications of this theory, or hypotheses. First, I draw on a diverse body of research on
psychology, social and procedural justice, and equity and fairness theories to argue that
perceptions of distributive unfairness are key factors whereby economic inequality
depresses support for the political system. A testable implication of this theoretical
argument is that at in a context of inequality, when individuals perceive their country’s
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income distribution to be unfair, they should be less likely to trust the government or be
satisfied with the way their country’s democracy functions. I also argue in Chapter 2 that
upper-class individuals, as well as those on the right of the political spectrum, should be
less likely to express political dissatisfaction for any perceived distributive unfairness that
they experience as a result of inequality. Finally, I argue that governance quality in a
country is vitally important for mitigating the negative influence of perceived distributive
unfairness on support for the political system. Although inequality challenges
individuals’ normative expectations about the outcomes that democracy is supposed to
produce, good governance provides citizens with alterative information that democracy is
indeed functioning properly, thus allaying their political concerns about distributive
injustice.
In Chapter 3, I use three waves of Latinobarometer survey data from 18 Latin
American countries to test each of the four hypotheses that I developed in Chapter 2. As I
explain in Chapter 3, Latinobarometer is ideal data for testing my theory because it
regularly includes a question about citizens’ perceptions of the fairness of the income
distribution, which is fundamentally distinct from citizens’ perceptions of trends in the
income distribution. I use a multilevel analysis of this survey data, which allows me to
examine how both individual-level factors, specifically class status and political ideology,
as well as country-level factors, such as aggregate inequality and governance quality,
affect the relationship between perceptions of distributive unfairness and support for the
political system. Consistent with a number of my hypotheses, I find that when controlling
for actual levels of inequality, perceptions of distributive unfairness are negatively and
significantly correlated with predicted satisfaction with democracy and trust in
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government. The cross-national analysis in Chapter 3 also shows that the negative
relationship between perceived distributive unfairness and political support is weakest
among right-leaning individuals, and that good governance mitigates this negative
relationship as well.
In Chapter 4, I use original survey experiments in Argentina, Mexico, and the
United States to isolate the causal effect of distributive fairness perceptions on political
support. The majority of the analysis in Chapter 4 centers around a large nationally
representative online survey I conducted in February 2019 in Argentina. I supplement
this analysis with previous versions of this survey experiment that I fielded in Mexico on
a student sample in 2018, and in 2017 in the United States using a convenience sample
from Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk platform. Results from three different
experiments, conducted over the course of two years in three different countries, are
remarkably similar and consistent with my theoretical expectations. Compared to
individuals who receive no information about inequality, learning that economic
inequality is increasing only erodes political support when framed as an unfair
distributive outcome. When given the opportunity to view inequality as a fair distributive
outcome, however, support for the political system rebounds.
In Chapter 5, I use a second original survey experiment that I fielded in Argentina
to investigate how governance quality – specifically, I manipulate information about the
level of corruption – affects the manner in which economic inequality maps onto
individuals’ perceptions of distributive unfairness, satisfaction with democracy, and trust
in government. Consistent with the theoretical expectations that I developed in Chapter
2, I find that participants are significantly less likely to say that the income distribution in
13

Argentina is unfair when they learn that despite increases in inequality, governance
quality is improving (compared to when it remains unchanged or gets worse). Likewise,
given the same information about increasing inequality, I find that individuals express
higher levels of satisfaction with democracy and trust in government when they read that
governance quality is improving.
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CHAPTER 2. A THEORY OF FAIRNESS PERCEPTIONS AND POLITICAL SUPPORT IN THE
FACE OF INEQUALITY
2.1

Introduction
In this chapter, I develop a theoretical framework that allows me to answer my

main research questions: what are the specific conditions under which economic
inequality undermines democratic legitimacy, and more specifically, how does inequality
map onto individuals’ perceptions of fairness and subsequently affect satisfaction with
democracy and trust in political institutions? In order to develop my theoretical
argument, I draw from a diverse body of literature on social and political psychology, as
well as quality of governance, to derive new hypotheses about how people form their
fairness judgments and use these judgments to evaluate democratic governments.
I argue that at the individual level, political ideology and class status condition
both the way that economic inequality maps onto perceptions of distributive unfairness
and the relationship between perceived distributive unfairness and political support. To
preview the argument, individuals on the political Right, as well as upper-class
individuals, should be less upset with economic inequality in the first place. Moreover,
even when these individuals perceive or experience distributive unfairness, they should
be less likely to express political dissatisfaction as a result. At the contextual level, I
argue that governance quality, or what some scholars have referred to as procedural
fairness (e.g., Linde 2012), conditions the relationship between economic inequality,
perceptions of distributive unfairness, and political support. Although unfair distributive
outcomes signal that democracy is not functioning properly, good governance, such as
low corruption, impartiality in the exercise of public authority, and transparent

procedures that allow citizens to hold their elected officials accountable, provide
alternative evidence that democracy is in fact functioning properly. As such, the
presence of these fair democratic processes and procedures should ally citizens’ concerns
about inequality and distributive unfairness, at least when it comes to evaluating
democratic legitimacy.

2.2

The Sources of Democratic Legitimacy and Political Support
Democratic consolidation depends of the legitimacy of democratic government

and upon democracy becoming “the only game in town” for both masses and elites (Linz
and Stephan 1996). In everyday language, we often think of legitimacy as the recognition
that a political authority has the right to rule, or more generally as “citizen support for the
government” (Booth and Seligson 2009, 8). Easton (1975, 451) defines legitimacy as
“the conviction that it is right and proper…to accept and obey the authorities and abide
by the requirements of the regime” (451), and extant literature argues that legitimacy, or
political support, is important for citizen acquiescence, especially with regard to policies
and political outcomes that people disagree with (Cleary and Stokes 2006; Gibson,
Caldeira, and Spence 2005; Tankebe 2013; Tyler 2004).
Developments in the Americas during the last two decades suggest that political
support, such as satisfaction with democracy or trust in representative institutions, is at
troubling low levels. In Mexico, for instance, less than 20 percent of the people
interviewed in the 2015 Latinobarometer survey indicated they were satisfied with the
way democracy works in their country, and in Brazil, barely 22 percent of respondents
were satisfied with democracy. This stands in stark contrast to countries such as Ecuador
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or Uruguay, where citizens’ satisfaction with democracy ranges between 60 and 70
percent. The low levels of political support that we observe across the region are of
particular concern, as a number of countries in the Americas are experiencing or have
previously experienced crises of representation (Mainwaring 2006), party system
collapses (Morgan 2011; Tanaka 2006) and the rise of illiberal populist leaders (Mayorga
2006).
Scholars have grappled to understand why political support is at troubling low
levels throughout the Americas. The literature on political legitimacy posits a number of
potential causes for widespread dissatisfaction with democracy and representation in
some countries. One set of explanations focuses on political institutions and the
representative outcomes they produce. Scholars have long argued that more consensual
institutions lead to higher levels of satisfaction with democratic institutions (Lijphart
1999). Citizens are generally less satisfied with democracy when they are consistently on
the losing side of elections (Anderson et al. 2005; Conroy-Krutz and Kerr 2015), but the
satisfaction gap between electoral winners and losers is smaller in consensual systems
than in majoritarian ones (Anderson and Guillory 1997; Cho and Bratton 2006). In
addition to how people get into office, prior research also shows that who gets into office
influences policymaking and citizens’ feelings about representation. Citizens are more
likely to positively evaluate the political system when they see representatives who “look
like them” (Banducci, Donovan, and Karp 2004), and representatives from different
groups bring different policy preferences to office (Barnes 2012; 2016). For instance,
legislators from blue-collar backgrounds are more likely promote policies that benefit the
working class, the majority of individuals in most countries, such as policies related to
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labor and employment (Carnes 2013; Carnes and Lupu 2015). And, as a result, citizens
are more satisfied with the representation they receive from political institutions when a
greater number of legislators come from working-class backgrounds (Barnes and Saxton
2019.).
Another set of explanations for democratic legitimacy, such as political trust and
satisfaction with the way democracy works in practice, focuses on citizens’ evaluations
of government performance, and suggests that the favorability of economic outcomes is
key to understanding political support (Booth and Seligson 2009; Dalton 2004;
McAllister 1999). Moreover, while negative evaluations of economic performance are
shown to haven a pernicious influence on political support in newer democracies,
perceptions of corruption and “subjective feelings of being represented” have larger
impacts on democratic satisfaction in more consolidated democracies (Dahlberg, Linde,
and Holmberg 2015). Such findings further suggest that when evaluating the functioning
of democratic governments, citizens care not only about political outputs, but about the
fairness of democratic procedures as well. Indeed, poor governance quality – i.e., a lack
of impartiality in the exercise of political authority (Rothstein and Teorell 2008) – is
associated with decreased satisfaction with democracy, not only in Latin America (WeitzShapiro 2008), but also in new and mature democracies more generally (Anderson and
Tverdova 2003; Kumlin and Esaisson 2012). For example, citizens are generally less
satisfied with democracy when they live in countries with high corruption (Anderson and
Tverdova 2003), as effective rule of law is critical for widespread citizens satisfaction
with authorities (Tyler 2003). By contrast, individuals are more satisfied with the way
their democracy functions when they perceive that elections guarantee the voices of all
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voters are represented (Aarts and Thomassen 2008). Recent research even suggests that
fair procedures attenuate the impact of government outputs on political dissatisfaction
(Magalhães 2016).
A growing body of research has also shown that economic inequality undermines
a whole host of political support indicators, including support for and satisfaction with
democracy, as well as trust in government. Using survey data from 20 European
countries, Anderson and Singer (2008) show that citizens in countries with high levels of
income inequality are, on average, less satisfied with democracy, and that this negative
relationship is strongest among those on the political left, or what they call the “sensitive
left.” More recently, Krieckhaus et al. (2014) examine World Value Survey data from 40
democracies and find that income inequality depresses support for democracy.
Krieckhaus et al. (2014, 150) explain that “citizens view economic inequality as a
referendum on democracy,” and that support for democracy is determined in part by
citizens’ evaluation of how inequality affects society as a whole. Zmerli & Castillo
(2015) demonstrate that in Latin America, high levels of income inequality are associated
with decreased trust in the national government. Furthermore, Córdova and Layton
(2016) show that regardless of improvements to government performance in service
provision, poor citizens in El Salvador are less likely to trust the municipal government
when they live in neighborhoods with high levels of inequality.
Extant research in this field has also suggested several causal mechanisms by
which economic inequality undermines political support. Given the well-documented
connection between economic and political inequality in the United States (e.g. Bartels
2008; Gilens 2012; Hacker and Pierson 2010), it is perhaps unsurprising that the
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concentration of wealth and income among a tiny percentage of the population would
lead to disillusionment and disenchantment with democratic and representative
institutions (Mainwaring 2006). Research from American politics, for instance, suggests
that economic inequality undermines political support by eroding citizens’ efficacy and
attachments to representative institutions. High levels of economic inequality are shown
to reduce participation in political campaigns (Ritter and Solt, forthcoming), voter turnout
(Solt 2010), and political engagement more generally (Solt 2008). In other words,
inequality undermines what scholars have called symbolic representation, or citizens’
feelings of being fairly and effectively represented (Barnes and Burchard 2013; Barnes
and Saxton 2019; Schwindt-Bayer 2010; Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005).
Research on American politics during the last decade also has shown that policy
outcomes across a range of issue areas reflect the preferences of the wealthiest citizens,
preferences that are vastly different from those of low- and middle-income citizens
(Gilens 2012). And moreover, policy outcomes over the last few decades in the US are
themselves contributing to increasing economic inequality (Bartels 2008; Hacker and
Pierson 2010). Thus, economic inequality violates the core democratic principle of one
person, one vote, by giving a small group of wealthy citizens undue political influence.
While the above research on inequality in the United States does not necessarily
imply that people accurately perceive or experience economic inequality, much of the
comparative political behavior research on inequality assumes, at least implicitly, that
individuals are aware of the economic disparities that exist in society, and that they view
inequality unfavorably. For instance, Anderson and Singer (2008, 586) caveat their
finding that economic inequality is associated with decreased satisfaction with democracy
20

by explaining: “these analyses assume that people experience inequality and perceive it
accurately – an assumption that is open to interpretation.” In investigating the
relationship between inequality and support for democracy, Krieckhaus et al. (2014) also
implicitly assume that individuals experience and accurately perceive inequality.
Economic voting and political economy literatures have produced competing
expectations about the relationship between inequality and support for democracy.
Political economy theories assume that democracy will reduce inequality (e.g., Acemoglu
and Robinson 2006; Meltzer and Richards 1981) and hence the vast majority of (poor)
citizens will support democracy as a means to even out the income distribution.
Krieckhaus et al. (2014) draw on economic voting literature to make an alternative
argument – and offer empirical support – that citizens look unfavorably upon inequality,
and when they experience high levels of inequality, their retrospective and sociotropic
evaluations of them economy lead them to support democracy less.
In these ways, objective levels of economic inequality certainly shape citizens’
political evaluations. Yet, when it comes to political support, such as satisfaction with
democracy and trust in government, I argue that citizens’ perceptions of the income
distribution are equally important. Not only do individuals sometimes misunderstand
(Kim, Pedersen, and Mutz 2016) and underestimate the true magnitude of income
disparities, especially at high levels of inequality (Osberg and Smeeding 2006), but they
also tend to legitimize income differences (Trump 2018) and become less supportive of
redistributive policies (Kelly and Enns 2010) as objective levels of inequality increase.
Indeed, in Latin America, objective levels of inequality and citizens’ perceptions of the
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fairness of the income distribution are only moderately correlated. 2 Below, I advance
these scholarly lines of research by examining how economic inequality maps onto
people’s perceptions of distributive fairness and subsequent political evaluations, and
how these relationships are conditioned by political ideology and class at the individuallevel, as well as by contextual factors such as governance quality and the fairness of
democratic procedures more generally.

2.3

Economic Inequality, Distributive Fairness, and Political Support
Inequality challenges a fundamental human motivation—people’s desire to live in

a just world (Kay and Jost 2003; Lerner and Miller 1978). Classic models of inequality
and democratization assume that under democracy the poor will demand wealth
redistribution, thus decreasing economic inequality (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006;
Meltzer and Richard 1981). An implication of this “conventional wisdom” is that certain
groups of people (i.e., the poor) dislike inequality, and they dislike it as a matter of
resource attribution: resources are finite, economic resources are concentrated in the
hands of the rich, and the poor want a larger share of these economic resources. Yet,
psychological research on social justice suggests that all citizens—rich and poor alike—
should dislike economic disparities, albeit for different reasons.
Drawing on equity theories that date back to Aristotle, this research suggests that
people care deeply about proportionality, that is, whether the outcomes that people

2 This figure is from the 2009-2015 Latinobarometer. The correlation (r=.44) represents
the relationship between objective inequality (Gini coefficient) and the average response
to the question “How fair is the income distribution in [country]?” in each country-year
of the survey (high values indicate more perceived unfairness).
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receive (income and other resources) are proportional to their inputs (e.g., time and
effort) (Jost and Kay 2010). For instance, if a CEO is paid 300 times the salary of an
average worker for what is perceived to be the same amount of time and effort, this
outcome violates the distributive justice concept of desert, or deservingness (Miller
1999). Although this disproportionate outcome clearly disadvantages the worker, leaving
her to feel angry or resentful, the CEO should feel guilty about being over-benefitted and
should seek to restore equity (Waksalk et al. 2007). 3
This is not to suggest that individuals want a perfectly egalitarian society. Indeed,
the whole idea of class mobility implies that a certain amount of inequality in society is
acceptable. It is not inequality, per se, that upsets people, but the unfairness of a system
that disproportionately benefits the wealthy at the expense of everyone else. Drawing on
Rawls, Jost and Kay (2010, 1129) explain, “Some degree of inequality in society is
tolerable, but only to the extent that it benefits those who are relatively disadvantaged, for
example by creating wealth so that everyone truly benefits.” There is no question that
inequality is objectively high in the Americas, yet I argue that what matters for
satisfaction with democracy and trust in political institutions is the extent to which
citizens perceive the economic distribution in their country as fair or unfair. When people
encounter information that challenges their desire to believe they live in a just world, they
experience negative and uncomfortable cognitive reactions, and they often look for an
individual or group – such as the government – to blame (Gurr 1986; Kay and Jost 2003;

3 Indeed, in Latin America, perceptions of distributive unfairness are remarkably similar
across wealth quintiles (Latinobarometer 2009-2015), and wealth quintile is not a
significant predictor of perceived distributive unfairness in multivariate models.
Additionally, the correlation between respondents’ perceptions of distributive unfairness
and class self-placement are extremely weak (r=.10).
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Lerner and Miller 1978). In particular, when citizens perceive inequality as an unfair
outcome resulting from the inaction of democratic governments, their political
satisfaction is likely to suffer. In other words, perceptions of distributive unfairness are
important factors linking inequality to political support. Given this I posit:
Hypothesis 1: On average, citizens who perceive the distribution of income in
their country as unfair will express lower levels of political support than
individuals who view the income distribution as fair.

2.4

The Conditioning Effects of Class Status Political Ideology
Although social justice theories predict that everyone should dislike inequality, for

reasons related to the desire for proportionality and equity, not everyone will respond to
inequality in the same manner. In this section, I develop a theoretical argument, as well
as testable hypotheses from this theory, about how two important individual-level factors,
class status and political ideology, condition the relationship between economic
inequality, perceptions of distributive unfairness, and support for the political system. To
preview the main argument in this section, I posit that upper-class individuals, as well as
those on the right of the political spectrum (or conservatives in the US context) should be
less upset by economic inequality in the first place. But, if and when these individuals
perceive distributive unfairness when they witness or experience economic inequality,
they should be less likely to experience political dissatisfaction as a result. To develop
these arguments, I rely primarily on deductive reasoning and draw on literature from
system justification theory, the moral foundations of political ideology, and left-right
semantics.
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2.4.1

Class Status
In the previous section, I argued that perceptions of distributive unfairness are key

to explaining prior findings that inequality damages political support. Yet, perceptions of
fairness and political support should vary by class status as well. For instance, more welloff individuals may witness the same levels of inequality as lower-class individuals, but
because they do not experience the negative side of inequality, they should be less likely
to perceive it as unfair. In the 2015 Latinobarometer, for instance, upper-class
individuals were significantly more likely that lower-class individuals to say the income
distribution in their country was either “fair” or “very fair” (p<.01). Yet even if and when
upper-class individuals view inequality as problematic, they may nonetheless believe that
is not the government’s responsibility to correct for a skewed economic distribution.
Social justice research and equity theories argue that individuals rely on a variety
of coping mechanisms for dealing with the distress that comes from experiencing
inequality and subsequently distributive injustice. In particular, individuals can either
respond to inequality behaviorally or cognitively (Jost and Kay 2010). That is, they could
try to do something about inequality, such as protesting or seeking restorative justice, or
they could try to rationalize inequality by denying or minimizing it (Jost et al. 2003).
Cognitive reactions often manifest themselves in victim blaming (Hafer et al. 2005) or
adopting legitimizing stereotypes that justify group differences (Cassese and Holman
2017; Kay and Jost 2003; Tyler 2006).
In his 2012 book, Martin Gilens shows that wealthy individuals in the United
States use their disproportionate affluence and influence to secure more conservative
economic policies, such as relaxed corporate regulation and more regressive tax policies.
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At the same time, in order to adjust psychologically to inequality, as social justice
research suggests all individuals do (Jost and Kay 2010), members of high-status groups
like the upper class often rely on legitimizing myths about deservingness or meritocracy
to understand inequality (Jost and Hunyady 2003), or on trait stereotypes that advantaged
groups are more “competent” (Fiske et al. 2002). According to individuals drawing on
such legitimizing myths, if inequality exists, blame rests with those disadvantaged by
inequality for not working hard enough to overcome their economic situation. All this
suggests that given the same context of objective inequality, upper-class individuals will
be less likely to perceive inequality as unfair in the first place.
Yet, just because upper-class individuals are less likely than lower-class
individuals to view inequality as problematic, this is not to say that the poor uniformly
dislike inequality and the wealthy like it. Recall that in Latin America, upper-class
individuals were significantly more likely (by about 10 percent) than lower-class
individuals to say the income distribution in their country was either “fair” or “very fair.”
Still, the vast majority of upper-class respondents, about 68 percent in 2015, still
indicated that their country’s income distribution was either “unfair” or “very unfair.”
But because upper-class individuals tend to have more pro-market views regarding the
state’s role in the economy (Carnes 2013; Carnes and Lupu 2015; Gilens 2012), they
should be less likely to express political dissatisfaction for any perceived distributive
unfairness that they experience as a result of inequality. Hence, I posit the following
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: The negative relationship between perceived distributive unfairness
and political support should be weakest among upper class citizens.
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2.4.2

Political Ideology
As with class status, I also argue that political ideology will condition that way

that inequality maps onto people’s perceptions of distributive fairness and subsequent
political evaluations. Specifically, people on the right of the political spectrum (also
referred to conservatives, especially in the US context) should be less distressed by
economic inequality in the first place, but if and when they perceive distributive
unfairness, they should be less likely to express dissatisfaction with the political system
as a result. To develop this argument and corresponding hypothesis, I return to the
literature on system justification, and I also incorporate insights from research on the
moral foundations of political ideology and left-right semantics.
Anderson and Singer’s (2008) seminal finding that high levels of income
inequality are associated with low levels of satisfaction with democracy is mainly driven
by individuals on the left of the political spectrum. This finding comports well with
research on the moral foundations of political ideology, which suggests that left-leaning
individuals are more likely to be upset with inequality and to view disproportionate
economic outcomes as unfair, for reasons related to deep-seated cognitive processes. In
particular, this research demonstrates that those on the left are more likely to moralize
outcomes they perceive as unfair or harmful to others, whereas those on the right are
more likely to moralize threats to order, authority, or the status quo (Graham et al 2009;
2012). Extending this logic, leftist citizens should be most distressed by high levels of
economic inequality that have disproportionately negative impacts on the poor, and they
should be more likely than right-leaning citizens to blame the government for an
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economic distribution that is continually concentrated in the hands of a small group of
wealthy citizens.
The above research suggests that those on the political right should be less
concerned than those on the left with economic inequality in the first place, yet even
when right-leaning individuals can acknowledge distributive unfairness, they should still
be less likely than left-leaning individuals to express political dissatisfaction as a result. 4
The propensity of those on the political right to moralize threats to order and authority
(Graham et al 2009; 2012) should make them less likely to criticize the political status
quo when looking for someone to blame. Moreover, given that political conservatism is
itself a system-legitimizing ideology, with conservatives being more likely to stereotype
and express hostility toward low-status out groups (Jost et al. 2003; Jost, Federico, and
Napier 2009), those on the right of the political spectrum should rely on some of the same
system justifying narratives as upper-class individuals (described in the previous section)
to justify group differences.
Much of the literature on political conservatism as a system justifying ideology
(e.g., Jost et al. 2003; Jost, Federico, and Napier 2009) is based on research from the
United States, where distinct liberal and conservative political ideologies map onto the
left-right political spectrum more cleanly than in Latin America. For instance, recent

4 Even though individuals on the right of the political spectrum should be less likely than
those on the left to moralize and/or be upset by economic inequality, plenty of rightleaning individuals in both the US and Latin America view the status quo economic
distribution as problematic. In the 2015 Latinobarometer, for instance, nearly threequarters of all right-leaning respondents indicated that their country’s income distribution
was either “unfair” or “very unfair.” In the 2017 MTurk study described above, about 51
percent of conservative participants indicated that the income distribution in the U.S. is
“unfair” or “very unfair.”
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research on the 2016 U.S. presidential election has shown that that two key system
justifying ideologies, hostile sexism and racial resentment, were significant predictors of
voting for the Republican candidate (Cassese and Barnes 2018; Schaffner, MacWilliams,
and Nteta 2018). Meanwhile, scholars have debated how well these ideological labels
transport to Latin America (Zechmeister 2006). To ensure that the conceptual
components of the arguments in this section actually travel from the United States to
Latin America, I briefly turn to survey data to examine whether system-justifying
attitudes correlate with left-right placement as they do in the United States.
The World Values Survey regularly measures a variety of system-justifying
attitudes related to inequality and the economy. I examine five attitudes in particular:
1) “We need larger income differences as incentives for individual efforts
2) “People (as opposed to the government) should take more responsibility to
provide for themselves.”
3) “Competition is good. It stimulates people to work hard and develop new
ideas.”
4) “In the long run, hard work usually brings a better life.”
5) “Wealth can grow so there’s enough for everyone” (as opposed to “people
only get rich at the expense of others”).
I first used principal components factor analysis to investigate how well these
system-justifying attitudes scale together. Factor analysis reveals that the first two
questions correlate with one underlying factor, while the last three questions correlate
with a second underlying factor. I then used multivariate regression to investigate how
well these different system-justifying attitudes predict left-right ideological placement in
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the seven Latin American countries included in Wave 6 of the WVS (see Appendix Table
A1 for OLS models with full controls and country-fixed effects). The questions about
income differences, personal responsibility, and there being enough wealth for everyone
are all significant (p<.001) predictors of rightist ideological placement. Saying that hard
work pays off predicts right-wing placement at p=.09, meanwhile attitudes about
competition being good are not associated with left-right placement in Latin America. Of
particular interest here, the best predictor of right-wing placement is agreement that “we
need larger income differences.” In substantive terms, moving from 1 (“incomes should
be made more equal”) to 10 (“we need larger income differences as incentives for
individual effort) is associated with a change in expected political ideology from 5.10 to
6.14 (on a 1 to 10 left-right scale). This statistically significant difference represents a
full scale-point move toward the right. These results are also robust to indexing the
questions about income differences and personal responsibility, which both correlate with
a common underlying factor. A move from the least to most system-justifying attitudes
is associated with a 1.3-point move to the right on the 1-10 left-right ideological scale.
In sum, political psychology research suggests that those on the left should be
more upset with inequality in the first place, and more likely to moralize and perceive it
as unfair, compared to those on the right. Yet, even when those on the right acknowledge
that economic inequality represents a form of distributive unfairness, they should still be
less likely than individuals on the left to express political dissatisfaction as a result. For
right-leaning individuals, criticizing the government for unfair distributive outcomes
poses a threat to the political and economic status quo. Moreover, when “cognitively
adjusting” to inequality, those on the right should be more likely than those on the left to
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blame the poor for perceived distributive injustice, than express dissatisfaction with the
political system. Thus, I posit the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: The negative relationship between perceived distributive unfairness
and political support should be weakest among right-leaning citizens.

2.5

Inequality, Fairness Perceptions, and Governance Quality
The above theory and hypothesis posit that citizens’ evaluations of distributive

outcomes shape their support for the political system. Yet, the context in which people
form their perceptions of economic inequality and distributive fairness matters for their
political evaluations as well. Specifically, insights from social psychology suggest that
governance quality – i.e., impartiality in the exercise of political authority (Rothstein and
Teorell 2008) – affects how citizens form judgments about inequality and distributive
fairness and use these judgments to subsequently evaluate democratic governments.
People care deeply about the procedures by which political outcomes are
produced (André and Depauw 2017; Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2001). In particular,
good governance, which some scholars have also referred to as procedural fairness
(Linde 2012), should diminish the extent to which distributive unfairness erodes political
support, even in the face of economic inequality. An implication of research on the Fair
Process Effect (e.g., Tyler and van der Toorn 2013; van den Bos, Wilke, Lind, and
Vermunt 1998) is that governance quality shapes people’s expectations about the
outcomes they receive and their responses to any distributive unfairness they may
experience. People desire fair procedures because they are perceived to produce fair
outcomes (Thibaut and Walker 1975), and people are generally more satisfied with
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outcomes—unfavorable or otherwise—when they are the result of fair and transparent
processes (van den Bos 2005).
Individuals often draw on multiple sources of information when forming their
judgments about fairness and democracy (André and Depauw 2017), and Fairness
Heuristic Theory (FTH) further suggests that governance quality is especially important
when people lack the information they need to make accurate social comparisons. People
often underestimate the true magnitude of income disparities at high levels of inequality
(Osberg and Smeeding 2006), and low status individuals tend to inflate their own position
in the income distribution (Aalberg 2003). If and when such accurate social comparisons
are lacking, FTH suggests that people use information about processes and procedures –
such as the quality of governance – to help form perceptions of distributive fairness, and
consequently evaluations of political support (Córdova and Layton 2016; Magalhães
2016; Van Ryzin 2011).
One important indicator of governance quality is corruption, which conveys
important messages to citizens about the fairness of government policies and processes.
Corruption on the part of government officials violates “the belief that the authority
makes genuine attempts at being fair and ethical” (Magalhães 2016, 525; Tyler and Lind
1992). It sends a signal that certain people are above the law, and that all citizens are not
treated equally (Linde 2012, 413). 5 In addition to affecting citizens’ judgments about

5 Although there is good reason to expect that corruption or poor governance is an
underlying cause of economic inequality (e.g., Uslaner 2008), the correlation between
inequality (Gini coefficient) and corruption (World Bank’s WGI control of corruption
measure) is virtually non-existent in Latin America (r=.002) during the period under
investigation. Moreover, the correlation between inequality and other governance
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fairness, corruption also impedes governance capacity (Graycar and Villa 2011), hinders
women’s political advancement (Stockemer and Sundström 2018; Sundström and
Wängnerud 2016), and undermines electoral accountability and democratic legitimacy
more generally (Alvarez, Hall, and Llewellyn 2008; Bauhr and Charron 2018; Booth and
Seligson 2009; Kumlin and Esaisson 2012; Linde and Erlingsson 2013).
Corruption is salient and pervasive in a number of Latin American countries, at all
levels of government. In the 2015 Latinobarometer, nearly 20 percent of all respondents
indicated that they or a family member had personally witnessed an act of corruption or
bribe taking by a politician or government official in the last year. Themes about
corruption, inequality, and support for the political system are also evident in elite and
media discourse in Latin America. An article in Clarín, a national newspaper in
Argentina, reported in 2018: “It would seem that a kind of vicious circle has been
generated between corruption, the unequal distribution of power in society and inequality
in the distribution of wealth. Corruption is destroying the fabric of society and the
confidence of the population in the political system and its leaders.” 6
Corruption can take many forms, including bribery and outright theft, and its
scope ranges from petty corruption, generally on the part of low-level civil servants, to
grand corruption orchestrated by high-level public officials (Bauhr 2017; Graycar and
Villa 2011). In a context of high poverty and inequality, there is good reason to expect
that governance indicators such as corruption shape citizens’ judgments about distributive

indicators, such as WGI’s government effectiveness (r=.16) or rule of law (r=14)
measures is equally weak.
6 https://www.clarin.com/economia/corrupcion-desigual-distribucionriqueza_0_B1N55Roqz.html
33

fairness and their subsequent evaluations of the political system. Corruption-as-theft
reduces the overall level of public resources that are necessary to successfully enact proegalitarian social welfare programs (Desierto 2019). And, although corruption-as-bribery
does not diminish the total amount of public goods available for redistribution, it
challenges societal norms about equality of economic opportunity (Rothstein and Uslaner
2005).
Although corruption is an important indicator of governance quality, or what
some scholars have referred to as procedural fairness (e.g., Linde 2012), we can also
think about governance quality in terms of electoral accountability or fair and transparent
government decision-making procedures that give voice to a variety of groups and
interests. People desire fair procedures because they are perceived to produce fair
outcomes (Thibaut and Walker 1975). Much of the research on procedural and
distributive fairness from psychology, for instance, demonstrates that that people are
generally more satisfied with processes and outcomes – whether objectively favorable or
unfavorable – when they are given a say in the decision-making process (e.g., van den
Bos 2005). Research on descriptive representation of racial minorities in the U.S. finds
that even when committees make decisions that go against minority interests, individuals
– blacks and whites alike – are more likely to view the decision-making process as fair.
Clayton, O’Brien, and Piscopo (2019) find that gender parity in decision-making bodies
increases both the committee’s substantive and procedural legitimacy. Specifically, they
find that when a gender-balanced panel makes a decision that restricts women’s rights,
people are more likely to view both the decision-making process, as well as the outcome
itself, as more legitimate.

34

Following the above logic, in a context of good governance, citizens should react
less unfavorably to social and economic inequalities in the first place. Yet, even when
citizens perceive or experience distributive unfairness, the presence of good governance,
such as the impartial exercise of public power (Linde 2012; Rothstein and Teorell 2008)
should make them less likely to express political dissatisfaction as a result. Thus, I posit
the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4: The negative relationship between perceptions of distributive
unfairness and political support will be weakest in a context of good governance.
Table 2.1 Summary of Hypotheses
Inequality and
H1: On average, citizens who perceive the distribution of
Distributive Unfairness income in their country as unfair will express lower levels
(average effects)
of political support than individuals who view the income
distribution as fair.
Conditioning Effect of
Class-Status

H2: The negative relationship between perceived
distributive unfairness and political support will be weakest
among upper-class individuals.

Conditioning Effect of
Political Ideology

H3: The negative relationship between perceived
distributive unfairness and political support will be weakest
among right-leaning individuals.

Conditioning Effect of
Governance Quality

H4: Good governance will weaken the negative relationship
between perceived distributive unfairness and political
support.

In this chapter, I have developed a series of arguments about the relationship
between economic inequality, perceptions of distributive unfairness, and support for the
political system. To recap, I argue that perceptions of distributive unfairness are key
factors by which economic inequality undermines trust in government and satisfaction
with democracy. I further argue that individuals’ class status and political ideology, as
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well as a country’s governance quality, all condition this relationship in important ways.
Table 2.1 summarizes the hypotheses I derived from each part of my theoretical
framework. In the next chapters, I use cross-national survey data, as well as original
survey experiments to empirically test the implications of the arguments I developed in
this chapter.
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CHAPTER 3. INEQUALITY, FAIRNESS PERCEPTIONS, AND POLITICAL SUPPORT: A CROSSNATIONAL ANALYSIS
“The state gets money to invest in society, such as social development, education, public
works, and health. This is the main activity that the state should do, but if the distribution
is not progressive and in favor of all society, there will be consequences for inequality.”
-Argentine Legislative advisor, UCR, 2018

In Chapter 2, I developed a theoretical argument that individuals’ perceptions of
distributive (un)fairness are key factors whereby inequalities in society translate into
political dissatisfaction. Research on social justice and equity theories suggest that all
individuals should be distressed by high levels of inequality, but just because individuals
dislike inequality, it does not necessarily follow that they will blame the government for
it. After all, inequality in the modern era is a natural product of capitalism and the free
market, and class mobility depends in part on there being at least some degree of
economic inequality in society (Jost and Kay 2010). Nevertheless, original qualitative
survey data that I collected in the United States suggests that even though people may see
inequality as resulting from the economic rather than the political system, many still think
government could or should do something to address it. 7 When asked about the causes of
economic inequality in the United States, a number of survey respondents indicated
sentiments similar to the following:

7 In March 2017, I administered a survey with embedded experimental manipulations
and open-ended survey questions on Amazon’s MTurk platform. Although MTurk uses
convivence samples, prior research has shown them to be more representative than
traditional convenience sample – e.g., student samples (Buhrmester et al. 2011), MTurk
samples have also been used to replicate existing political science studies remarkably
well (Berinsky et al. 2012).

“One word…government.”
“The minimum wage is too low which generates a very low household income
that the family has barely enough to support the family with the increasing cost of
living, healthcare, and property.

“I think it’s mostly government policies that favor the rich. Also, middle class
people don’t receive any help.”

“Market deregulation has ‘unreformed’ practices that have a history of creating
bad behavior.”

Without prompting, people draw connections between factors such as government
controls, the minimum wage, deregulation, or tax policies and economic inequality.
Taken together, these excerpts suggest that people understand how government could
implement policies that reduce inequality, and they recognize that the government is not
doing as much as it could to alleviate the problem.
There is also ample evidence from Latin America to suggest that individuals draw
strong connections between government in(action) and economic inequalities in society.
In Argentina, for instance, the vast majority of citizens believe the government should
redistribute wealth to reduce economic inequality (Lupu, 2016). Elsewhere in Latin
America, anywhere from 70 to 90 percent of citizens indicate that the government
“should enact firm policies to reduce inequality” (Seligson, Smith, and Zechmeister
2012).
Similar themes about government (in)action and inequality in Latin America also
appear in elite discourse. Consider, for example, the excerpt at the opening of this
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chapter. In Summer 2018, I conducted several interviews on a convenience sample of
political elites in Buenos Aires, Argentina. When asked about the causes and
consequences of economic inequality in Argentina, a former advisor to the Buenos Aires
City Legislature and party official in the Radical Civic Union (UCR) explained,
“The state gets money to invest in society, such as social development, education,
public works, and health. This is the main activity that the state should do, but if
the distribution is not progressive and in favor of all society, there will be
consequences for inequality.” 8

She went on to explain that the previous government of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner
“did a lot for the distribution between rich and poor people.” In comparison to the current
government of Mauricio Macri, Kirchner’s government did much more for a “fair
distribution of wealth between rich and poor people,” but at the present time, inequality
has returned “because poor people are not being promoted in politics.” These examples
do not suggest that individuals want a perfectly egalitarian economic distribution.
Rather, they are distressed by a skewed income distribution because they perceive it to be
an unfair outcome resulting from government policies that disproportionately benefit one
small group of citizens at the expense of the rest.

3.1

Fairness Perceptions and Political Support in Latin America
In this first empirical chapter, I use public opinion data from 18 Latin American

countries from 2011 to 2015 as a first test all of the hypotheses I developed in Chapter 2.
In many ways, Latin America is an ideal case for testing hypotheses related to

8 Author interview, June 2018.
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individuals’ perceptions of the income distribution and support for the political system.
First, while Latin America as a region has the highest levels of economic inequality in the
world (Lopez-Calva and Lustig 2010), there is significant variation in the level of
inequality between countries. In the period under investigation, the Gini coefficient for
net income inequality (Solt 2016) ranges from a low of 36.5 in Venezuela to a high of
52.17 in Honduras. 9 The left panel Figure 3.1 illustrates this trend using the most
recently available inequality figures, sorted from highest to lowest income inequality.
The right panel in Figure 3.1 is a scatterplot showing the correlation between aggregate
levels of inequality and the mean response to the question “how fair is the income
distribution in your country” for each Latinobarometer country-year in my cross-national
sample (1=very fair to 4=very unfair), as well as the corresponding regression line.
Although the slope of the regression line in Figure 3.1 is statistically significant, the
aggregate correlation between inequality and perceptions of distributive unfairness is
moderate (r=.51), indicating the actual inequality only explains part of the variance in
individuals’ judgments about the fairness of the income distribution.
Prior empirical research has demonstrated a robust correlation between high
levels of income inequality and low levels of a host of political support indicators, from
support for democracy (Krieckhaus et al. 2014) to satisfaction with democracy (Anderson
and Singer 2008) and trust in government (Córdova and Layton 2016; Zmerli and
Castillo 2015). Indeed, the patterns in Figure 3.1 and 3.2 are generally consistent with

9 The Gini coefficient for net income inequality is a measure of inequality accounting for
income after taxes and transfers. Theoretically this measure goes from 0, representing
perfect equality (all people have the same income), to 100, representing perfect inequality
(one person has all the income in a country).
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these findings. Countries with low levels of income inequality by Latin American
standards, such as Uruguay and Argentina, have comparatively higher levels of
satisfaction with democracy and trust in government (see Figure 3.2). A key part of my
argument, however, is that individuals’ perceptions of distributive unfairness, which are
only moderately correlated with actual levels of inequality are other important predictors
of political support.
Figure 3.1 Inequality and Fairness Perceptions in Latin America

Note: The left panel shows the Gini coefficient for net income inequality (Solt 2016) for each
Latin American country in the sample. The right panel shows the aggregate-level correlation
between income inequality and each country’s average amount of perceived distributive
unfairness along with the corresponding regression line.

The fact that actual inequality is an imperfect predictor of individuals’ fairness
perceptions is fully consistent with qualitative data that I collected in the U.S. and
Argentina, as well as with my theoretical argument that certain groups of people – i.e.,
upper-class (H2) and right-leaning (H3) citizens – are more likely to legitimize income
differences. Consider this response to a question about the causes of economic inequality
in the U.S.:
“There is always going to be income inequality in a capitalist system. Education
and training are big contributors… I worked hard for my degree to get a decent
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job with opportunities…People should make more effort to equalize their incomes
on their own.”

Here, there is an acknowledgment that inequality exists, but this respondent also places
the responsibility for addressing inequality on those individuals disadvantaged by the
inequality, rather than the government. According to this view, inequality is natural, and
it is fair.
Qualitative survey evidence shows that US respondents frequently engage in such
system-justifying legitimation. When asked about the causes of economic inequality in
the U.S., a common reply is that people are “lazy,” or,
“The rich stay rich because those people are smart and look for ways to maintain
being rich. The poor look for ways to receive more handouts from the government
and don't look to find ways to improve their situation like the rich do.”

“I think part of the problem is some people simply don’t want to work hard to get
ahead. Too many people rely on the government for help.”

“Some people simply work harder at earning a living than others do, some people
would rather be lazy and rely on assistance.”

Again, similar sentiments appear outside the United States too. When discussing the
topic of inequality in Argentina, a legislative aid to a national Deputy mentioned that
poverty and inequality are “structural problems” in Argentina, in that they are selfreinforcing. This aid then elaborated that many poor people in Argentina suffer from a
poor work ethic:
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“I believe that we don’t have an employment culture, a culture related to work.
People who can get a job aren’t interested in working because the state will give
you lots of things like housing and food.”

Certain individuals may be well aware of the inequalities that exist in society, but
nevertheless still have a material self-interest in maintaining the economic status quo, no
matter how skewed it may be.
For the abovementioned reasons, the empirical focus in this chapter is on
individuals’ perceptions of distributive unfairness, which I account for while also
controlling for actual levels of inequality at the country-level. Figure 3.2 demonstrates
that there is substantial variation not only in perceptions of distributive unfairness, but
also in satisfaction with democracy and trust in government across these 18 Latin
American countries. Figure 3.2 shows the percentage of respondents indicating that they
perceive their country’s income distribution as unfair, are satisfied with democracy, and
trust the government. Each of these questions from Latinobarometer are coded on a 1 to
4 scale. The percentages displayed in Figure 3.2 reflect individuals selecting either of the
top two response outcomes.
Figure 3.2 Distribution of Key Measures Across Latin America

Variation in these key measures is vital for testing my hypothesis that individuals
will be less likely to support the political system when they perceive their country’s
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income distribution to be unfair. As Figure 3.2 illustrates, satisfaction with democracy
ranges from a low of less than 20 percent indicating “satisfied” or “very satisfied” in
Mexico to a high of more than 70 percent in Uruguay. Likewise, citizens in Mexico,
Peru, El Salvador, and Brazil exhibit troubling low levels of trust in government – around
20 percent indicating that they trust the government “some” or “a lot” – compared to
citizens in countries such as Uruguay or the Dominican Republic. Democratic
legitimacy, as indicated in measures such as trust in government and satisfaction with
democracy, are vital for democratic stability (Cleary and Stokes 2006), and the low levels
of political support observed in a number of countries raise important questions about the
state of democratic consolidation in the region. The results in Figure 3.2 appear
consistent with my hypothesis that perceptions of distributive unfairness are associated
with lower levels of political support. In countries such as Brazil and Colombia, the
overwhelming majority of citizens, more than 90 percent, indicate that they perceive their
country’s income distribution to be “unfair” or “very unfair.” These same countries also
have some of the lowest levels of satisfaction with democracy and trust in government in
the region. To fully test the hypotheses that I developed in Chapter 2, I turn to a
multilevel analysis of Latinobarometer survey data.

3.2

Methods and Data
Despite the general patterns discussed above, prior research has documented a

number of other individual-level and contextual predictors of political support like
satisfaction with democracy, from the nature of a country’s electoral system (Anderson
and Guillory 1997), to economic performance and citizens’ evaluations of the national
economy (Booth and Seligson 2009; Dalton 2004; McAllister 1999), corruption
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(Anderson and Tverdova), and support for the incumbent government (Anderson et al.
2005). To simultaneously account for a variety of predictors of political support, I turn to
a multivariate, multilevel analysis of Latinobarometer survey data. I use three waves of
data from 2011 to 2015, covering 18 Latin American countries, and I estimate a series of
multilevel ordered logit models in Stata 15 to examine the relationship between
individuals’ fairness judgments and two measures of political support: satisfaction with
democracy and trust in government. For each dependent variable, I first estimate a series
of baseline models to test Hypothesis 1 about the direct effect relationship between
fairness perceptions and political support. I then estimate a series of models with
individual-level and cross-level interactions to test Hypotheses 2 through 4.

3.2.1

Dependent Variables
My primary objective in this first empirical chapter is to investigate the

relationship between perceptions of distributive unfairness and support for the political
system. The empirical chapters in this dissertation employ two specific indicators of
political support: satisfaction with democracy and trust in government. Neither of these
measures are what Easton (1975) would refer to as “diffuse” measures of political
support, yet they are stable enough to resist the short-term fluctuations of “specific”
support that political authorities tend to face (Dalton, 2004; Hetherington 1998).
Prior research theorizes that political support is itself a multidimensional concept.
Much of the contemporary work on political support builds upon Easton’s (1975)
distinction between specific and diffuse forms of political support. Easton explains that
specific support is directed toward specific political institutions and authorities, whereas
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diffuse support is directed toward the ideas that these political authorities and intuitions
represent. More recently, scholars have reimagined Easton’s conceptualization of
political support not as a dichotomy, but as a continuum that runs from specific to diffuse
forms of support. Norris (1999; 2011) describes five objects of political support: political
actors (most specific), regime institutions, regime performance, regime principles, and
the political community (most diffuse). Booth and Seligson (2009) identify a sixth object
of political support: local government. Although diffuse support for democratic norms is
vital for democratic stability and consolidation, more specific forms of support are also
important, as a prolonged period of democratic dissatisfaction or declining trust may have
serious consequences for the stability and consolidation of democracies in the region.
Satisfaction with Democracy: Satisfaction with democracy represents an
important dimension of state legitimacy (Norris 2011) that taps the level of support “for
how the democratic regime works in practice” (Linde and Eckman 2003). To measure
satisfaction with democracy, Latinobarometer asks respondents, “In general, would you
say that you are very satisfied, quite satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied
with the working of democracy in your country?” Responses in the analysis are coded
such that “very dissatisfied” (coded 1); “dissatisfied” (2); “satisfied” (3); and “very
satisfied” (4). As Figure 3.3 illustrates, the modal response to this question is
“dissatisfied”, with 42 percent of all respondents in the pooled sample selecting this
response outcome.
Trust in Government: Citizens need to trust their political institutions in order for
democracy to function properly (Cleary and Stokes 2006; Hetherington 1998).
Institutional trust is particularly important for citizens’ acquiescence, especially regarding
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policies and political outcomes that people disagree with (Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence
2005; Tankebe 2013). As with democratic satisfaction, however, trust in government is
at troubling low levels in a number of Latin American countries. To measure trust in
government, Latinobarometer asks respondents, “How much trust do you have in the
national government? Would you say you have a lot (coded 1), some (2) a little (3), or no
trust (4)?” For the analysis, responses to this question are recoded such that higher values
indicate more trust. As Figure 3.3 illustrates, the modal response to this question in the
pooled sample is “a little” (33 percent of respondents) followed closely by “not at all” (28
percent of respondents).
Figure 3.3 Distribution of Fairness Perceptions and Political Support, Pooled Sample

Note: Responses are pooled across all country-years in the 2011-2015 Latinobarometer waves.

3.2.2

Independent Variables
Perceptions of Distributive Unfairness The primary individual-level predictor of

satisfaction with democracy and trust in government, perceptions of distributive
unfairness, is based on the Latinobarometer question, “How fair do you think the income
distribution is in your country?” This survey item is ideal for the research at hand: it
maps onto the core theoretical concept—i.e., fairness perceptions, as opposed to
assessments or evaluations of actual inequality—remarkably well. Cross-national public
opinion surveys frequently ask respondents whether they think the gap between the rich
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and poor is getting bigger or smaller, but just because individuals perceive inequality to
be on the rise, they will not necessarily respond negatively to it (Trump 2018).
Latinobarometer is one of the few surveys that consistently asks this question about
distributive fairness perceptions. Responses in the analysis range from “very fair” (coded
1) to “very unfair” (4), and as Figure 3.3 illustrates, the modal response to this question is
3 (“unfair”).
Political Ideology: Although I hypothesize that, on average, all individuals should
be less likely to trust the government or be satisfied with democracy when they perceive
their country’s income distribution to be unfair, I also argue that the extent of this
relationship should be conditional on political ideology. Specifically, I explain that those
on the political right should be less likely to view inequality as unfair in the first place,
yet even when right-leaning individuals perceive distributive unfairness, as they do in
Latin America (see Appendix Figure B1 for the distribution of distributive fairness
perceptions across the ideological spectrum in the most recent Latinobarometer survey),
they should be less likely to express political dissatisfaction as a result. Political ideology
comes from the question, “in politics, people normally speak of “left” and “right.” On a
scale where 0 is left and 10 is right, where would you place yourself?” The modal
ideological response in the pooled data sample is a “5,” with about 32 percent of
respondents indicating that they are in the middle of the ideological scale. The rest of
respondents are fairly evenly distributed around the middle, with about 31 percent of
respondents to the left and 37 of respondents to the right of the middle.
Subjective Class Status: I also hypothesize that individuals’ class status conditions
the relationship between inequality, fairness perceptions, and subsequent evaluations of
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the government. Prior research has operationalized “class” in a variety of ways,
including socioeconomic status measures based on income (Gilens 2009; Llores, Rosset,
and Wüest 2015) and education (Putnam 1976; Taylor-Robinson 2010), and more
recently, occupational status (Carnes 2013; Carnes and Lupu 2015; Barnes and Saxton
2019). Occupational-based measure of class are ideal because the primary class
cleavages in most societies revolve around the labor market and how individuals earn a
living (Carnes 2013, 3). Unfortunately, Latinobaromoeter does not consistently ask about
individuals’ occupations, Thus I cannot construct an occupation-based measure of social
class. Instead, I rely on a class self-placement question that asks individuals whether they
perceive themselves as belonging to the “lower” (coded 1), “lower middle” (2), “middle”
(3), “upper middle” (4), or “upper” class (5). The modal subjective social class response
is 3, with about 40 percent of respondents perceiving themselves as belonging to the
middle class. Only about 5 percent of respondents perceive themselves as belonging to
either the “upper middle” or “upper” class. 10
Governance Quality: In addition to individual-level factors, I hypothesize that
governance quality should ameliorate the negative influence of perceived distributive
unfairness on political support. Previous research has identified a number of different
ways for measuring governance quality, one of which is corruption. In the results below,
I operationalize governance quality as control of corruption, using a measure from the
World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project (Kaufmann, Kraay, and

10 Subjective social class is only moderately correlated with either education (r=.29) or
an asset-based measure of wealth (r=.28) in the pooled data sample. Latinobaromoeter
does not ask about respondents’ income in the period under investigation.
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Mastruzzi 2010). 11 Control of corruption captures “[expert] perceptions of the extent to
which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of
corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and private interests.” The control of
corruption figures used in this analysis correspond to the year immediately preceding the
respective Latinobarometer wave. The control of corruption measure theoretically
ranges from -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values indicating lower levels of corruption. In this
sample, the control of corruption measure ranges from -1.38 (Venezuela in 2015) to 1.56
(Chile in 2013), with a mean value of -.30. 12 In Appendix Table B1 and B2, I
demonstrate that the results are also robust to other measures of governance quality,
including WGI measures of rule of law, voice and accountability, and government
effectiveness.
3.2.3

Control Variables
To control for potential sources of spuriousness, I include a number of individual-

level variables in the main analysis that existing research consistently shows to be
important predictors of support for the political system and that theoretically could
correlate with perceptions of distributive unfairness, particularly: support for the
incumbent government and perceptions of the national economy. Individuals who
approve of the incumbent and express favorable evaluations of the economy are more
likely to support the political system (e.g., Anderson et al. 2005; McAllister 1999), and
these individuals could be less likely to blame the government for unfavorable

11 See http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#doc for methodology and information
about control of corruption other WGI measures of governance quality.
12 See Appendix Figure B2 for the distribution.
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distributive outcomes. Support for the incumbent comes from the question, “Do you
approve or not of the performance of the government led by President (name)?”
Responses are coded such that 0=Disapprove and 1=Approve. Perceptions of the national
economy comes from the question, “Do you consider the country’s present economic
situation to be better (coded 1), a little better (2), the same (3), a little worse (4), or much
worse (5) than 12 months ago?” To rule out the possibility that socioeconomic factors are
driving both political support and perceptions of distributive unfairness, I control for
wealth quintile (Córdova 2009) and education, as well as respondent’s sex, age, and
whether the respondent lives in a rural area.
In addition to individual-level covariates, I control for factors at the country-level
that could theoretically correlate with fairness perceptions and political support,
particularly aggregate levels of inequality. Although the focus here is on perceptions of
fairness of the income distribution, as opposed to objective levels of inequality, there is
reason to suspect that aggregate inequality could affect both perceptions of distributive
unfairness (Trump 2018) and support for the political system (e.g., Anderson and Singer
2008; Zmerli and Castillo 2015). To account for this possibility, I include a measure of
net national-level income inequality from the Standardized World Income Inequality
Database (Solt, 2016). Inequality figures represent the most recent available Gini
coefficients prior to the survey year.

3.3

Perceptions of Distributive Unfairness and Satisfaction with Democracy
To test Hypothesis 1, that individuals who perceive their country’s income

distribution as unfair will be express lower levels of political support, I estimate a series
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of multilevel ordered logit regressions in which satisfaction with democracy is the
dependent variable. Table 3.1 includes a series of baseline models without any
interactions. Models 1 and 2 include only individual-level covariates, Model 3 introduces
governance quality (control of corruption), and Model 4 includes all individual-level and
higher-order variables. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, the coefficient on perceived
distributive unfairness is negative and statistically significant across model specifications.
In Figure 3.4, I present this relationship graphically by calculating and plotting the
predicted probability of observing each satisfaction with democracy response outcome,
for each value of perceived distributive unfairness. Consistent again with my main
theoretical argument and Hypothesis 1, individuals who view the income distribution as
unfair are more likely than those who perceive it as fair to be “very dissatisfied” or
“dissatisfied” with democracy, and less likely to be “satisfied” or “very satisfied” with
democracy. In substantive terms, individuals who view the income distribution in their
country as “very fair” only have a .06 probability of being “very dissatisfied” with
democracy (top-left panel in Figure 3.4), where as individuals who view the income
distribution as “very unfair” have a .24 probability of being “very dissatisfied.” Turning
to the bottom-right panel in Figure 3.4, individuals who perceive the income distribution
as “very fair” have a .23 probability of being “very satisfied” with the way democracy
works in their country, compared to a .06 probability for individuals who view the
income distribution as “very unfair.”
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Table 3.1 Perceived Distributive Unfairness and Satisfaction with Democracy, Baseline
Models
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Perceived Distributive Unfairness
-.82***
-.58***
-.58***
-.57***
(.04)
(.04)
(.04)
(.04)
Political Ideology 0-10=Right
.00
.00
.00
(.00)
(.00)
(.00)
Subjective social class
.07***
.07***
.07***
(.01)
(.01)
(.01)
Governance Quality
.45***
.31**
(.12)
(.10)
Individual-Level Control
Economic Perception (Worse)
-.42***
-.42***
-.42***
(.01)
(.01)
(.01)
Education
-.01***
-.01***
-.01***
(.00)
(.00)
(.00)
Rural
.04
.04
.04
(.03)
(.03)
(.03)
Incumbent Approval
.80***
.80***
.80***
(.02)
(.02)
(.02)
Wealth Quintile
.01
.01
.01
(.01)
(.01)
(.01)
Female
-.03
-.03
-.03
(.02)
(.02)
(.02)
Country-Level Control
Income Inequality
-.10***
(.02)
Cut 1
-4.22*** -4.44*** -4.59*** -9.07***
(.14)
(.14)
(.16)
(.85)
Cut 2
-1.96*** -2.03*** -2.18*** -6.66***
(.14)
(.14)
(.15)
(.85)
Cut 3
.11
.13
-.02
-4.50***
(.14)
(.14)
(.15)
(.84)
Observations
54,516
40620
40620
40620
Country-Years
54
54
54
54
Wald Chi2
371.49
3994.21
4012.23
4050.88
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 (standard errors), multilevel ordered logit coefficients.
DV: “How satisfied are you with the functioning of democracy in your country?” very dissatisfied
(coded 1) to very satisfied (coded 4).
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Figure 3.4 Perceived Distributive Unfairness and Satisfaction with Democracy

Note: Point estimates represent the predicted probability of observing a given outcome, bars
represent 95% confidence intervals. Predicted probabilities were calculated using the results in
Table 3.1, Model 4.

In the next section, I turn to the interactive models in Table 3.2 to examine how
individuals’ class and political ideology, as well as a country’s governance quality,
condition the relationship between perceptions of distributive unfairness and satisfaction
with democracy. Model 1 in Table 3.2 includes an individual-level interaction between
subjective social class and perceived unfairness (H2). Model 2 includes an individuallevel interaction between political ideology and perceived unfairness (H3). Model 3
includes a cross-level interaction between governance quality and perceived unfairness
(H4). Model 4 includes all interactions as a robustness check, but in the sections below, I
focus on Models 1-3 for my discussion of the results.
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Table 3.2 Perceived Distributive Unfairness and Satisfaction, Interactive Models
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Perceived Distributive Unfairness
-.57***
-.70***
-.52***
-.60***
(.04)
(.03)
(.02)
(.04)
Subjective Social Class
.10*
.07***
.07***
.11**
(.04)
(.01)
(.01)
(.04)
Unfair X Class
-.01
-.02
(.01)
(.01)
Political Ideology 0-10=Right
-.01*
-.06***
-.00
-.07***
(.00)
(.01)
(.00)
(.01)
Unfair X Ideology
.02***
.02***
(.00)
(.00)
Governance Quality
.43***
.43***
-.22*
-.24*
(.09)
(.09)
(.11)
(.11)
Unfair X Governance
.21***
.22***
(.02)
(.02)
Individual-Level Control
Economic Perception (Worse)
-.43***
-.43***
-.42***
-.42***
(.01)
(.01)
(.01)
(.01)
Education
-.01***
-.01***
-.01***
-.01***
(.00)
(.00)
(.00)
(.00)
Rural
.04
.04
.04
.04
(.03)
(.03)
(.03)
(.03)
Incumbent Approval
.82***
.82***
.82***
.81***
(.02)
(.02)
(.02)
(.02)
Wealth Quintile
.01
.01
.01
.01
(.01)
(.01)
(.01)
(.01)
Female
-.03
-.03
-.03
-.03
(.02)
(.02)
(.02)
(.02)
Country-Level Control
Income Inequality
-.07***
-.07***
-.08***
-.07***
(.02)
(.02)
(.02)
(.02)
Cut 1
-8.02*** -8.32*** -7.89*** -8.04***
(.77)
(.76)
(.77)
(.78)
Cut 2
-5.63*** -5.93*** -5.49*** -5.64***
(.76)
(.76)
(.77)
(.78)
Cut 3
-3.48*** -3.78*** -3.34*** -3.49***
(.76)
(.76)
(.77)
(.78)
Observations
40620
40620
40620
40620
Country-Years
54
54
54
54
Wald Chi2
7458.48
7471.94
7581.21
7601.81
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 (standard errors), multilevel ordered logit coefficients.
DV: “How satisfied are you with the functioning of democracy in your country?” very dissatisfied (coded
1) to very satisfied (4).
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3.3.1

Class, Fairness Perceptions, and Satisfaction with Democracy
Hypothesis 2 posits that the relationship between perceived distributive unfairness

and political support will be weakest among upper-class individuals. Although the
relationship between subjective social class and satisfaction with democracy, on its own,
is positive and significant in Table 3.1, the results in Table 3.2 Models 1 and 4 suggest
that class does not condition relationship between fairness perceptions and political
support. The interactions between subjective social class and perceived distributive
unfairness in both models are insignificant. The marginal effect of an increase in
perceived distributive unfairness on the probability of observing the “very dissatisfied”
outcome is around .07, regardless of social class. Likewise, the marginal effect of an
increase in perceived distributive unfairness on the probability of observing the “very
dissatisfied” is consistently between -.05 and -.06, regardless of subjective social class.
Although the negative effect of perceived distributive unfairness on observing the “very
dissatisfied” outcome appears slightly stronger for upper-class compared to lower-class
individuals, these differences are not statistically different. The results in Table 3.2,
Models 1 and 4, do not lend support for Hypothesis 2: subjective social class has no
discernable conditioning effect on the relationship between fairness perceptions and
satisfaction with democracy.
3.3.2

Political Ideology, Fairness Perceptions, and Satisfaction with Democracy
Turning to Models 2 and 4 in Table 3.2, the positive and significant coefficient on

the interaction term suggests, consistent with Hypothesis 3, that political ideology
conditions the relationship between perceived distributive unfairness and satisfaction
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Figure 3.5 Political Ideology, Perceived Distributive Unfairness, and Satisfaction

=
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with democracy. Since Hypothesis 3 posits that moving to the right on the political
ideological spectrum should weaken the relationship between fairness perceptions and
political support, I present two different graphical representations of the interaction in
Model 2. The panels on the left side of Figure 3.5 show the marginal effect of an
increase in perceived distributive unfairness on the probability of observing a given
response outcome. When interpreting marginal effects, the further away a point estimate
is from y=0, the stronger the relationship between the independent and dependent
variable. Negative (positive) marginal effects mean that an increase in the independent
variable is associated with a decrease (increase) in the dependent variable.
If Hypothesis 3 is correct, we should observe the marginal effect estimates
weakening, or becoming less positive or negative, as we move from left to right on the
ideological spectrum. Indeed, this is exactly what the panels in the left column of Figure
3.5 show. Although the marginal effect of an increase in perceived unfairness is
associated with an increase in the probability of being dissatisfied and a decrease in the
probability of being satisfied with democracy for all individuals, this relationship is
weakest on the right of the political spectrum. Yet, the right column of Figure 3.5 shows
that this change in marginal effects is actually being driven by people who view the
income distribution as “very fair.”
Predicted satisfaction, regardless of the response outcome, is relatively similar
across the ideological spectrum for individuals who perceive the income distribution as
“very unfair.” Yet, those on the right are more likely than those on the left to be
“dissatisfied” with democracy when they perceive the income distribution as “very fair,”
and less likely to be “very satisfied” when they view the income distribution as “very
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fair.” The largest satisfaction gap between those who view the income distribution as
“very unfair” compared to “very fair” exists among people on the left of the political
spectrum. In this sense, the results in Figure 3.5 lend support to Hypothesis 3, in that
fairness perceptions matter more for political support among left-leaning individuals. In
one way, this finding is consistent with literature on the moral foundations of political
ideology. Recall, this literature posits that those on the political left are more likely to
moralize outcomes they perceive as unfair or harmful to others, whereas those on the
political right care more about order, authority, and the political and economic status quo
(Graham et al 2009; 2012). However, that the narrowing satisfaction gap as we move
from left to right on the ideological spectrum is actually being driven by changes in
perceptions of fairness, as opposed to perceptions of unfairness, is not consistent with my
argument that individuals on the political right are more likely to rely on legitimizing
narratives the allay their political concerns about inequality, at least when it comes to
satisfaction with democracy. Perceptions of distributive fairness or unfairness simply
matter less for those on the right than those on the left when it comes to evaluating the
functioning of democracy.
3.3.3

Governance Quality, Fairness Perceptions, and Satisfaction with Democracy
In Chapter 2, I also laid out expectations that governance quality will condition

how citizens use their fairness judgments to evaluate the political system. Specifically,
Hypothesis 4 posits that good governance should weaken the negative relationship
between perceived distributive unfairness and support for the political system. Although
inequality and perceived distributive injustice should erode political support by
challenging citizens’ normative expectations about the outcomes that democracy is
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supposed to produce, the presence of good governance provides alternative information
that the democratic process is functioning properly. However, weak state capacity and
poor governance compound the damaging effects of inequality. Not only do citizens
view as the unfair distributive outcome tied to government inaction, but bad governance,
such as pervasive corruption, impedes governments’ ability to enact effective proegalitarian reforms. As a legislative aid for a National Deputy in Argentina noted, “The
state is promoting lots of policies and projects to reduce inequality, but resources like
houses and money aren’t being given to the right people; they’re in the wrong hands
because of corruption.” 13 When programs meant to reduce social and economic
inequalities are not administered impartially, the democratic process is not affording all
citizens equal opportunities for economic progress, and hence citizens should be more
likely to express political dissatisfaction for what they perceive as an unfair economic
distribution.
In Table 3.2, Model 3, I include a cross-level interaction between individuals’
fairness perceptions and a country’s governance quality, which I operationalize using a
measure of control of corruption from the World Banks’s Worldwide Governance
Indicators (WGI) project (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2010). The coefficient on the
interaction term in Model 3 is positive and significant. In the left column of Figure 3.6, I

13 Author interview, June 2018. The interviews used in this dissertation are based on a
convenience sample of Argentine political elites in Buenos Aires. Although not
generalizable to all political elites in Argentina or Latin America, these interviews offer
supporting examples of prior theoretical arguments and help contextualize empirical
results from cross-national analysis.
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Figure 3.6 Governance Quality, Perceived Distributive Unfairness, and Satisfaction
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use the results from Table 3.2, Model 3 to calculate and plot the average marginal effect
of an increase in perceived distributive unfairness on the probability of observing each
satisfaction with democracy response outcome, across the range of governance quality
(control of corruption) values in the sample. In the right panel of Figure 3.6, I do the
same, but instead of marginal effects, I calculate and plot the predicted probability of
observing each outcome, for individuals who view the income distribution as “very fair”
(black solid line) and “very unfair (gray dashed line). Consistent with Hypothesis 4, the
positive effect of an increase in perceived unfairness on the probability of observing the
“very dissatisfied” outcome weakens as governance quality improves (top-left panel).
Likewise, the negative effect of an increase in perceived unfairness on the probability of
observing “satisfied” or “very satisfied” also weakens as governance quality improves.
Although an increase in perceived distributive unfairness is associated with a decrease in
the probability of being “satisfied” or “very satisfied” with the way democracy is
functioning, on average, this relationship is considerably weaker in a context of good
governance than in a context of poor governance.
Turning to the right column in Figure 3.6, the conditioning effect of governance
quality on the relationship between perceived distributive unfairness and satisfaction with
democracy is most pronounced among citizens who perceive their country’s income
distribution as “very unfair.” Individuals who perceive the income distribution as “very
fair” have a consistently low baseline probability of being dissatisfied with democracy,
and a consistently high probability of being satisfied. Yet, improvements in governance
quality are associated with a narrowing of the “satisfaction gap” between people who
perceive their country’s income distribution as “very fair” compared to “very unfair.” In
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substantive terms, an individual who perceives her country’s income as “very unfair” has
a .35 probability of being “very dissatisfied” with democracy in a context of poor
governance. In a context of good governance, however, that same individual would only
have a .09 probability of being “very dissatisfied” with democracy. Conversely, an
individual who views her country’s income distribution as “very unfair” only has a .03
probability of being “very satisfied” with democracy in a context of poor governance. In
a context of good governance, however, that same individual would have a .15
probability of being “very satisfied.”
Consistent with my theoretical expectations, good governance significantly
mitigates the negative influence of perceived distributive unfairness on satisfaction with
democracy. Even when individuals perceive their country’s income distribution to be
fundamentally unfair, they are still less likely to be dissatisfied and more likely to be
satisfied with the way their democracy functions when they live in a country with good
governance. Taken together, the results in Table 3.2, Model 3, and Figure 3.6 are fully
consistent with Hypothesis 4. Although poor governance signals to citizens that
inequality cannot effectively be addressed through the democratic process, good
governance significantly mitigates the negative influence of perceived distributive
unfairness on satisfaction with democracy.

3.4

Perceptions of Distributive Unfairness and Trust in Government
In these final sections of Chapter 3, I investigate the relationship between

individuals’ perceptions of distributive unfairness and trust in government. As previously
mentioned, trust in government is another important indicator of support for the political
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system. Trust allows political institutions to function properly (Cleary and Stokes 2006;
Hetherington 1998), and it helps ensure citizens’ acquiescence, especially regarding
policies and political outcomes that people disagree with (Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence
2005; Tankebe 2013). The discussion of results in this section will proceed like the
satisfaction with democracy results. First, I will present a series of baseline multilevel
ordered logit models and will use these models to discuss the relationship between
perceived distributive unfairness and trust in government (Hypothesis 1). Next, I present
a series of interactive models that allow me to test my hypotheses about the conditioning
effect of class (H2), political ideology (H3), and governance quality (H4).
The results in Table 3.3 are consistent with my main theoretical argument that
perceived distributive unfairness erodes support for the political system. Across model
specifications, the coefficient on perceived distributive unfairness is negative and
statistically significant, indicating that individuals are less likely to trust the national
government when they perceive their country’s income distribution as unfair. Turning
briefly to some of the other independent variables in Table 3.3, subjective social class and
governance quality are positively associated with trust, with upper-class individuals and
people in countries with good governance being more likely to trust the government, on
average. Individuals who approve of the incumbent president are also more likely to trust
the government. Being on the right of the political spectrum is associated with decreased
trust, as is expressing negative evaluations of the economy, having a higher level of
education, being a woman, and living in a country with high income inequality.
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Table 3.3 Perceived Distributive Unfairness and Trust in Government, Baseline Models
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Perceived Distributive Unfairness
-.76***
-.50***
-.50***
-.50***
(.05)
(.05)
(.05)
(.05)
Political Ideology 0-10=Right
-.01***
-.01***
-.01***
(.00)
(.00)
(.00)
Subjective Social Class
.06***
.06***
.06***
(.01)
(.01)
(.01)
Governance Quality
.21**
.17*
(.07)
(.07)
Individual-Level Control
Economic Perception (Worse)
-.39***
-.39***
-.39***
(.01)
(.01)
(.01)
Education
-.01***
-.01***
-.01***
(.00)
(.00)
(.00)
Rural
.05*
.05*
.05*
(.03)
(.03)
(.03)
Incumbent Approval
1.54***
1.54***
1.54***
(.02)
(.02)
(.02)
Wealth Quintile
.00
.00
.00
(.01)
(.01)
(.01)
Female
-.04*
-.04*
-.04*
(.02)
(.02)
(.02)
Country-Level Control
Income Inequality
-.04**
(.02)
Cut 1
-3.41*** -3.19*** -3.26*** -5.13***
(.16)
(.16)
(.17)
(.72)
Cut 2
-1.77*** -1.32*** -1.39*** -3.25***
(.16)
(.16)
(.17)
(.72)
Cut 3
.05
.72***
.66***
-1.21
(.16)
(.16)
(.17)
(.72)
Observations
75926
41221
41221
41221
Country-Years
54
54
54
54
2
Wald Chi
229.75
7502.38
7515.82
7523.87
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 (standard errors), multilevel ordered logit coefficients.
DV: “How much trust do you have in the national government?” none (coded 1) to a lot (4).

Yet even after accounting for all of these other factors, individuals who perceive
their country’s income distribution as unfair are still discernibly less likely to trust the
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national government. Figure 3.7 shows this direct effect graphically. In substantive
terms, individuals who view their country’s income distribution as “very fair” have a .14
probability of saying the trust the national government “not at all,” whereas individuals
who view the income distribution as “very unfair” have a .35 probability of indicating no
trust in the government. Conversely, individuals who view the income distribution as
“very fair” have a .23 probability of trusting the government “a lot,” compared to a .07
probability for people who view the income distribution as “very unfair.” Taken
together, the results in Table 3.3 and Figure 3.7 are fully consistent with Hypothesis 1:
people who perceive the income distribution in their country are less likely to support the
political system, as indicated by their level of trust in the national government.
Figure 3.7 Perceived Distributive Unfairness and Trust in Government

Notes: Bars represent 95% CIs around point estimates. Calculated using Table 3.3, Model 4.
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3.4.1

Class, Fairness Perceptions, and Trust in Government
Model 1 in Table 3.4 includes an individual-level interaction between subjective

social class and fairness perceptions and allows me to test the hypothesis that the
relationship between perceived distributive unfairness and political support will be
weaker among upper-class compared to lower-class individuals. The interaction
coefficient in Model 1 is negative and significant (p=.02). To aid in the interpretation of
this interaction, I calculate and plot the marginal effect of an increase in perceived
distributive unfairness on the probability of observing each trust outcome option, for each
subjective social class value in the left column of Figure 3.8. In the right column of
Figure 3.8, I do the same, except I plot predicted probabilities for individuals who
perceive the income distribution as “very fair” and “very unfair.”
As Figure 3.8 shows, relationship between perceived distributive unfairness and
trust in government is stronger for upper-class than for lower-class citizens. The
marginal effect of an increase in perceived distributive unfairness on the probability of
observing trust “none” or “a little” (two top-left panels) is positive and significantly
different from zero for all individuals, although this effect strongest for self-identified
upper-class individuals. Conversely, the average marginal effect of an increase in
perceived unfairness on the probability of observing trust “some” or “a lot” (two bottomleft panels) is negative for all individuals, although strongest among the upper-class.
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Table 3.4 Perceived Distributive Unfairness and Trust in Government, Interactive
Models
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Perceived Distributive Unfairness
-.44***
-.63***
-.47***
-.51***
(.03)
(.03)
(.02)
(.04)
Subjective Social Class
.15***
.06***
.06***
.16***
(.04)
(.01)
(.01)
(.04)
Unfair X Social Class
-.03*
-.04**
(.01)
(.01)
Political Ideology 0-10=Right
-.03***
-.09***
-.03***
-.10***
(.00)
(.01)
(.00)
(.01)
Unfair X Ideology
.02***
.03***
(.00)
(.00)
Governance Quality
.14*
.15*
-.29***
-.31***
(.06)
(.07)
(.08)
(.08)
Unfair X Governance
.14***
.15***
(.02)
(.02)
Individual-Level Control
Economic Perception (Worse)
-.40***
-.40***
-.40***
-.39***
(.01)
(.01)
(.01)
(.01)
Education
-.01***
-.01***
-.01***
-.01***
(.00)
(.00)
(.00)
(.00)
Rural
.05*
.05*
.06*
.05*
(.03)
(.03)
(.03)
(.03)
Incumbent Approval
1.59***
1.58***
1.58***
1.58***
(.02)
(.02)
(.02)
(.02)
Wealth Quintile
.00
.00
.01
.01
(.01)
(.01)
(.01)
(.01)
Female
-.04*
-.04*
-.04*
-.04*
(.02)
(.02)
(.02)
(.02)
Country-Level Control
Income Inequality
-.04***
-.04***
-.05***
-.04***
(.01)
(.01)
(.01)
(.01)
Cut 1
-5.17*** -5.66*** -5.25*** -5.30***
(.55)
(.55)
(.54)
(.55)
Cut 2
-3.30*** -3.79*** -3.39*** -3.44***
(.55)
(.55)
(.54)
(.55)
Cut 3
-1.29*
-1.78**
-1.38*
-1.42**
(.55)
(.55)
(.54)
(.55)
Observations
41221
41221
41221
41221
Country-Years
54
54
54
54
2
Wald Chi
11096.09 11114.73 11137.34 11169.31
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 (standard errors), multilevel ordered logit coefficients.
DV: “How much trust do you have in the national government?” none (coded 1) to a lot (4).
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Figure 3.8 Class, Perceived Distributive Unfairness, and Trust in Government
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The panels on the right of Figure 3.8 show that most of the conditioning effect of
class is evident among individuals who perceive the income distribution as “very fair,”
and the differences between lower-class and upper-class individuals are most pronounced
for the “little” and “a lot” outcome options. Among individuals who view their country’s
income distribution as “very fair,” upper-class individuals have a lower probability,
compared to lower-class individuals, of saying they trust the government only “a little,”
and a higher probability of saying they trust the government “a lot” (nearly ten
percentage points higher). Class, however, has a negligible conditioning effect on the
relationship between “very unfair” perceptions of the income distribution and trust in
government. All individuals, regardless of class, have a consistently high probability of
saying they have no trust in the national government (around .35), and a relatively low
probability of saying they trust the government “a lot” (around .07).
In sum, the results in this section are inconsistent with my argument that the
relationship between perceived distributive unfairness and political support should be
weaker among upper-class than lower-class individuals. Not only is the relationship
between perceived distributive unfairness and trust stronger for upper-class than lowerclass individuals, but the largest “trust gap” (where there is one in Figure 3.8) between
“very fair” and “very unfair” perceptions of the income distribution is for those upperclass respondents in the sample. Moreover, the fact that I observe no difference in lowerclass and upper-class individuals’ trust in government when they perceive the income
distribution as unfair suggests that upper-class individuals, at least in this Latin American
context, are not relying on system-justifying narratives to absolve the government of
blame for any perceived distributive unfairness they experience.
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3.4.2

Political Ideology, Fairness Perceptions, and Trust in Government

Model 2 in Table 3.4 includes an individual-level interaction between left-right political
ideology and perceived distributive unfairness. The coefficient on the interaction term is
positive and significant, indicating that political ideology conditions the relationship
between individuals’ perceptions of the income distribution and their trust in the national
government. The marginal effects and predicted probabilities in Figure 3.9 are
remarkably similar to the relationship between fairness perceptions, political ideology,
and satisfaction with democracy discussed in the previous section. Consistent with
Hypothesis 3, the relationship between perceived distributive unfairness and trust in
government weakens with a move from left to right on the ideological spectrum. That is,
the positive relationship between perceived unfairness and trusting the government
“none” or “a little” is less positive among right-leaning individuals than left-leaning
individuals, and the negative relationship between perceived unfairness and trusting the
government “some” or “a lot” becomes less negative with a move to the right.
As the predicted probability panels on the right of Figure 3.9 illustrate, the
conditioning effect of political ideology is most evident among people who perceive their
country’s income distribution as “very fair.” Whereas all individuals who perceive the
income distribution as “very unfair”, regardless of political ideology, have a relatively
high probability of saying the trust the government “none,” and a relatively low
probability of indicating trust “a lot,” the relationship between “very fair” perceptions
and trust varies considerably depending on political ideology. Turning first to the topright panel in Figure 3.9, individuals who perceive their country’s income distribution as
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Figure 3.9 Political Ideology, Perceived Distributive Unfairness, and Trust in
Government
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“very unfair” have about a .35 probability of indicating they have no trust in the national
government. Among individuals who perceive the income distribution as “very fair,”
those on the left have a .09 probability of indicating no trust, compared to those on right
who’s predicted probability is around .16, a nearly 80% higher probability. Turning to
the bottom-right panel in Figure 3.9, individuals who perceive the income distribution as
“very unfair” only have a .07 probability of saying they trust the government “a lot,”
regardless of their political ideology.
Yet, when those on the left perceive the income distribution as “very fair,” they
have a .29 probability of saying they trust the government “a lot,” compared to a .19
probability for those on the right of the political spectrum. In sum, the results in Table
3.4, Model 2, and Figure 3.9 lend partial support to Hypothesis 3. The relationship
between individuals’ fairness perceptions and trust in government is weaker among those
on the right of the political spectrum, compared to those on the left. In this sense, the
results in Figure 3.9 are consistent with Hypothesis 3. But, the conditioning effect of
political ideology on this relationship is most evident among people who perceive the
income distribution as “very fair.” Among people on the left, there is a large trust gap
between those who perceive the income distribution as “very fair” versus “very unfair.”
This trust gap is significantly smaller on the right of the political spectrum, but only
because right-leaning individuals are more likely than left-leaning individuals to distrust
the government, and less likely to trust the government, when they perceive the income
distribution as fair.
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3.4.3

Governance Quality, Fairness Perceptions, and Trust in Government
This section offers an additional test of Hypothesis 4, that governance quality will

mitigate the negative effect of perceived distribution unfairness on political support. As
the positive and significant coefficient on the cross-level interaction term in Table 3.4,
Model 3 suggests, the relationship between individuals’ fairness perceptions and trust in
government is indeed conditional on the quality of governance in a country. Figure 3.10
presents this cross-level interaction graphically. As with democratic satisfaction, the
positive relationship between an increase in perceived unfairness and the trust “none”
outcome weakens considerably as governance quality improves (top left panel).
Likewise, the negative relationship between perceived unfairness and the trust “some”
and “a lot” outcomes weakens as governance quality improves (two bottom-left panels).
Although perceiving the income distribution as increasingly unfair is associated with a
decreased probability of trusting the national government, on average, this negative
relationship is most pronounced in countries with poor governance quality.
As the right panels in Figure 3.10 illustrate, governance quality has the most
pronounced conditioning effect for “very unfair” perceptions. Turning first to the topright panel, individuals who view their country’s income distribution as “very unfair”
have a .40 probability of indicating they have no trust in the national government when
they live in a country with poor governance quality. In countries with the best
governance quality in the sample, however, these same individuals have a .24 probability
of indicating no trust in the government. Turning to the “some” and “a lot” outcomes,
Figure 3.10 illustrates the point that good governance mitigates the pernicious influence
of perceived distributive unfairness on trust in government. Among individuals who
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Figure 3.10 Governance Quality, Perceived Distributive Unfairness, and Trust
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perceive their country’s income distribution as “very unfair,” the probability of observing
the trust “a lot” outcome is only .05 in a context of poor governance. In countries with
good governance, however, this probability more than doubles to .11. The conditioning
effect of governance quality is likewise pronounced for the trust “some” (=3) outcome
(which is nearly as common as the “none” outcome in the pooled sample, around 28
percent of respondents). In countries with poor governance quality, individuals who
perceive the income distribution as “very unfair.” have a .20 probability of saying the
trust the national government “some” of the time. In countries with good governance
quality, this probability increases by nearly .10.
In sum, the results in this section lend strong support to my hypothesis about
fairness perceptions, governance quality, and political support (H4). Good governance
significantly mitigates the negative influence of perceived distributive unfairness on
political support. The “trust gap” between people who perceive their country’s income
distribution as “very fair” compared to “very unfair” is widest where governance quality
is the worst in Latin America. As governance quality improves, this “trust gap” narrows,
primarily because individuals who perceive high levels of distributive unfairness in
society are nonetheless willing to express political trust. Although inequality in Latin
America is likely to remain high by global standards for the foreseeable future, these
results offer optimism for the prospects of democratic stability in the region.

3.5

Discussion and Conclusion
Political support is at troubling low levels and has been steadily declining during

the last decade in a number of Latin American countries. In Brazil, for instance, recent
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high-profile corruption scandals coupled with a severe economic recession have left
citizens disillusioned with their democratic institutions. 14 Prior research has linked
dissatisfaction and disenchantment with democratic institutions to weak state capacity
and poor governance (Anderson and Tverdova 2003; Kumlin and Esaisson 2012;
Mainwaring 2006; Weitz-Shapiro 2008), legislative gridlock (Singh and Carlin 2015),
and economic inequality (Anderson and Singer 2008). In this chapter, I advance these
scholarly lines of inquiry by examining how individuals’ perceptions of distributive
(un)fairness in a region plagued by high inequality affects individuals’ evaluations of the
political system.
Table 3.5 Hypotheses and Empirical Support
Hypothesis

Supported?

H1: On average, citizens who perceive the distribution of income in
their country as unfair will express lower levels of political support than
individuals who view the income distribution as fair.

Yes

H2: The negative relationship between perceived distributive unfairness
and political support will be weakest among upper-class individuals.

No

H3: The negative relationship between perceived distributive unfairness
and political support will be weakest among right-leaning individuals.

Partially

H4: Good governance will weaken the negative relationship between
perceived distributive unfairness and political support.

Yes

Using a multilevel analysis of public opinion data from 18 Latin American
countries (2011-2015), I show that even when controlling for aggregate levels of income
inequality, individuals are less likely to be satisfied with democracy or trust the

14 https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/in-brazil-nostalgia-grows-forthe-dictatorship--not-the-brutality-but-the-law-and-order/2018/03/14/bc58ded2-1cdd11e8-98f5-ceecfa8741b6_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.c7fe0436d084
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government when they perceive their country’s income distribution to be unfair. This
cross-national analysis also reveals that both of the aforementioned relationships are
conditioned by individuals’ political ideology, as well as the context of governance
quality in a country. Table 3.5 summarizes the hypotheses that are tested in this chapter,
and which of these hypotheses are consistent with the empirical results discussed in the
preceding sections.
Although purely observations research designs such as the one in this chapter do
not afford scholars an airtight exposition of causality, results from my multilevel analysis
are consistent with my theory that individuals are, on average, less likely to be satisfied
with democracy or trust the government when they perceive high levels of distributive
unfairness. Moreover, this result holds even after controlling for other previously
theorized determinants of political support, such as aggregate levels of income inequality,
as well as approval of the incumbent government and retrospective evaluations of the
economy. To further isolate the causal effects of inequality and perceptions of
distributive unfairness, I have designed a series of survey experiment that will allow me
to test my theorized causal mechanisms. In Chapter 4, I use a survey experiment to
investigate how information about distributive (un)fairness affects support for the
political system, as well as how these treatment effects vary by class and political
ideology. In Chapter 5, I use another survey experiment to investigate how governance
quality affects individuals’ political evaluations of economic inequality.
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CHAPTER 4. INEQUALITY AND FAIRNESS FRAMES: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE FROM
ARGENTINA, MEXICO, AND THE UNITED STATES

In the first empirical chapter of this dissertation, I used cross-national survey data
from 18 Latin American countries to show that perceptions of distributive unfairness are
negatively correlated with democratic satisfaction. Although the cross-national analysis
in Chapter 3 is consistent with my theoretical argument that perceptions of distributive
unfairness are a key factor whereby economic inequalities in society erodes support for
the political system, such observational designs do not allow me to offer an airtight
exposition of causality. Hence, I turn to an experimental design, which offers a number of
advantages over purely observational studies when it comes to isolating causal effects.
Experiments give researchers control over the data generating process—in particular,
control over exposure to the independent variable, or treatment—thus allowing for
greater certainty that an observed change in the dependent variable is the result of the
independent variable.
In this chapter, I discuss the results of survey experiments from Argentina,
Mexico, and the United States in which I present participants with information about
rising economic inequality, frame this increase in inequality as either an unfair or fair
distributive outcome, and then evaluate support for the political system. By conducting a
series of single-country studies, I am able to hold actual levels of inequality constant in
each experiment while simultaneously manipulating individuals’ perceptions of
distributive (un)fairness. Recall from Chapter 2 that while all individuals should be
distressed by disproportionate economic outcomes (Jost and Kay 2010; Waksalk et al.
2007), they oftentimes “cognitively adjust” by rationalizing inequality (Jost et al. 2003,

Tyler 2006) or adopting legitimizing stereotypes that justify group differences (Cassese,
Barnes, and Branton 2015; Cassese and Holman 2017; Kay and Jost 2003; Tyler 2006).
Indeed, a constant theme that has come up in nearly every elite interview I conducted in
Argentina, over the course of two years and with elites from across the political spectrum,
is that a major cause of inequality is that Argentina lacks a “culture of work.” When I
ask political elites – who by and large are now members of the upper-strata of society,
regardless of their backgrounds – “what do you think are some of the causes of persistent
inequality in Argentina,” common responses include:
“People don’t have a working culture, there’s an idea that life is easier than it
actually is, we need to re-educate and create a commitment with work, for them to
know what it is to wake up early, go to work, get the food to the table. All this
culture has been lost on 1/3 of the population of Argentina.” 15
“I believe the social policies have to help people work, rather than just giving
them everything. They will become used to the state giving them everything and
then they will stop working.” 16
“I believe that we don’t have an employment culture, a culture related to work.
People who can get a job aren’t interested in working because the state will give
you lots of things like housing and food. There’s a great problem with
employment…It’s very hard to find employees to work in your business if you’re
a CEO. The system is complicated because people who get welfare benefits from
the state lose these benefits if they start a job. So, they choose not to work so they
can keep the social welfare benefits.” 17

Although some individuals, in particular elites in society, are quick to blame
inequality on a lack of work ethic among the lower classes – a clear example of
stereotypes meant to legitimize inequality – others place the blame squarely on the

15 Author interview, Buenos Aires Provincial Deputy (UCR), March 2019.
16 Author interview, Buenos Aires Provincial Deputy (Frente Renovador), March 2019.
17 Author interview, aid to Argentine National Deputy (PRO), May 2018.
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government. The notion that individuals view inequality as an unfair outcome
inextricably linked to government (in)action is a theme that consistently emerged from a
variety of qualitative data that I collected both in the United States and in Argentina.
Individuals are generally less satisfied with the political system when the outcomes
produced in a democracy do not match their normative expectations about what
democracy should do in practice (Singh and Carlin 2015). When citizens perceive high
levels of distributive unfairness – for example, they perceive the distribution of wealth or
income in their country as unfair – this signals that the democratic process is not
producing the outcomes it was intended to produce, such as a more equitable distribution
of economic resources (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Meltzer and Richards 1981). In
other words, individuals view inequality through a lens of distributive unfairness when
they see their democratic governments failing to remedy economic disparities in society –
for instance by enacting inadequate worker protections or tax policies that
disproportionately benefit the wealthy – and they express political dissatisfaction and
disillusionment as a result.
Indeed, a theme that consistently emerged from my qualitative data of survey
respondents in the U.S. is that economic inequality is the result of unfair tax policies.
Consider the following responses:
“I think that unfair corporate tax policies play a major part in the unequal
redistribution of wealth as the economy recovers. Corporate profits overpower the
needs of the workers as well, leaving many people with unfair wages and
benefits.”
“I think tax loop holes are a big part of it. The average citizen has to pay all their
taxes or they will go to jail. Wealthy people always have ways around paying the
taxes they are supposed to.”
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“The loopholes and laws in place favor the wealthy to ultimately earn more.
Taxes also favor the wealthy, keeping the wealth with the wealthy.”

Similar themes are evident in Brazil as well. Katia Maria, the director of the Brazilian
institute of Geography and Statistics, recently noted:
“We pay a lot of taxes. But it is not that our taxation is excessive, in fact it is
unfair. We are below the OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development) [in terms of tax burden] average. But it is a taxation where those
who pay the most are the middle class and the poorest people.” 18

In the above examples, respondents see the causes of inequality as resulting from
government policies that disproportionately benefit one small group of citizens at the
expense of the rest. Moreover, these unfair outcomes are the direct result of government
action. Current political leaders, who many Americans see as being in the pocket of
business leaders, are using the tax code unfairly to make sure “the rich keep getting
richer” (Hacker and Pierson 2010).
Although the above discussion suggests that individuals in the US blame
government because they perceive a lack of equality of outcome, they also blame the
political system for a lack of equality of opportunity. Another common theme that
emerged from my qualitative survey responses in the US is that the government is to
blame for a lack of educational opportunities, which ultimately prevents upward class
mobility:

18 https://riotimesonline.com/brazil-news/rio-politics/more-than-25-million-braziliansliving-below-poverty-line/
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“Poor educational opportunities for the very poorest Americans, generational
poverty, lack of ability for poor Americans to inherit from relatives, tax codes that
strongly favor the wealthy.
“I think that education has a lot to do with inequality in the economy. Too many
young people who live at a poverty level drop out of school, and with no
education or training they are not able to get a job that pays a decent wage and a
way to get ahead.”
“Poor social spending which doesn’t offer low income people the chance to climb
up. Education is incredibly expensive and so is healthcare. These keep people
locked in low end jobs with no chance of greater success.”

Similar themes surrounding government’s responsibility for inequalities in
economic opportunities emerge in both elite and media discourse in Argentina, especially
regarding education policy. During an elite interview, a legislative aid to a national
Deputy from the PRO (a center-right party in Argentina that belongs to the Cambiemos
coalition) explained that in addition to structural factors that create a cycle of poverty,
education is a major problem in Argentina because of inequalities between public and
private schools: “Children usually just go to public school to have lunch or a coffee
because they are in real poverty, but they are not learning as much as the kids going to
private schools.”
These sentiments are echoed in media discourse as well. An article in La Nación,
a major national newspaper in Argentina, discusses how the public education system in
Buenos Aires is basically divided in two, with well-equipped schools in wealthy northern
Buenos Aires neighborhoods like Palermo, and poorly-equipped schools in the southern
neighborhoods, where housing, employment, and health conditions are all worse as well.
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The article goes on to explain that these inequalities in the public education system
perpetuate other forms of socioeconomic inequality for students later in life. 19
If my expectations surrounding Hypothesis 1 are correct, I expect to see inequality
undermine satisfaction with democracy when it is framed as an unfair distributive
outcome, especially an outcome that impedes equality of opportunity for all citizens.
Yet, offering individuals an opportunity to legitimize large income differences should
mitigate the negative influence of economic inequality on political support that prior
research has documented (Anderson and Singer 2008; Córdova and Layton 2016;
Krieckhaus et al. 2014; Zmerli and Castillo 2015).

4.1

Experimental Design
The main analysis in this chapter centers around an online survey with embedded

experimental treatments that I fielded in Argentina in February 2019. I supplement this
analysis with data from previous versions of the same survey experiment that I
administered to a student sample in Mexico in Spring 2018, and to a convenience sample
in the United States using Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk Platform in Spring 2017. I
choose to focus my analysis on the Argentina survey because the data are of higher
quality and the sample was drawn to approximate national representativeness. As I
discuss later in the chapter, the results from Argentina are largely supportive of the
theoretical arguments I developed in Chapter 2. Importantly, the fact that experiments on
convenience samples in Mexico and the United States are also fairly consistent with my

19 “La desigualdad en las escuelas públicas divide la ciudad en dos.” La Nación,
Educación, Abril 2018.
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results from Argentina speaks to both the replicability and generalizability of my
findings.
The main experiment analyzed in this chapter was embedded in a survey using an
online panel from the survey firm Netquest. The sample was drawn from a population of
Netquest panelists over the age of 18, and quotas were used to ensure that the sample was
nationally representative with regard to sex, age, and socioeconomic status (household
income). In total, 3,040 participants took part in the survey. A subset of the sample
(N=1,180) was randomly assigned to participate in the survey experiment analyzed in this
chapter. This subset of participants was then randomly assigned to be in the control group
or to receive one of three experimental treatments. Participants in the control group read
a neutral statement about the size of the Argentine economy in relation to other Latin
American countries. Participants receiving Treatment 1 also received information about
increasing economic inequality. Participants in Treatments 2 and 3 received the same
information, plus one additional sentence that was designed to frame inequality as either
an unfair (Treatment 2) or fair (Treatment 3) distributive outcome. Of particular
importance, the distributive (un)fairness frames that I used in the Argentina experiment
are meant to tie information about inequality to (in)equality in opportunities, an
important theme that emerges in qualitative data from multiple cases examined in this
dissertation. The exact wording of each vignette is described below:

Control: Consistent with previous years, the Argentine economy was the 4th
largest in Latin America.
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Treatment 1: Consistent with previous years, the Argentine economy was the 4th
largest in Latin America. However, the gap between the rich and poor in
Argentina is larger than it has been in 12 years.

Treatment 2: Consistent with previous years, the Argentine economy was the 4th
largest in Latin America. However, the gap between the rich and poor in
Argentina is larger than it has been in 12 years. Inequality is unfair because it
punishes children and prevents opportunities for success in the future.

Treatment 3: Consistent with previous years, the Argentine economy was the 4th
largest in Latin America. However, the gap between the rich and poor in
Argentina is larger than it has been in 12 years. Inequality is fair because it
rewards hardworking people and creates opportunities for success in the future.

After reading one of these four vignettes, I asked participants about their support for the
political system:
With this in mind, how satisfied are you with the functioning of democracy in
Argentina? Are you very dissatisfied (coded 1), dissatisfied (2), neither
dissatisfied nor satisfied (3), satisfied (4), or very satisfied (5)?
After the post-treatment questions, I also asked all of the participants in this
experiment a “traditional” manipulation check question that was designed to ensure they
received the information in the vignette they read. 20 Specifically, I asked respondent to
how large Argentina’s economy was in the scenario they read: “In the previous question,
how large was the Argentine economy? Was it the second largest (coded 1), third largest
(2), fourth largest (3), or fifth largest (5) in Latin America?” At the end of the survey, all

20 Although this kind of manipulation check is common, especially in political science
and psychology experiments “to assess whether or not the subject was exposed to the
treatment by asking them a question that could only be answered by reading the
treatment” (Berinsky, Margolis, and Sances 2014), there is some debate about the
effectiveness of this approach (e.g., Gerber et al. 2015).
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participants read a debriefing statement thanking them for their participation and
informing that all of the stories and scenarios they read were purely hypothetical.
Unfortunately, less than half of the participants in this experiment correctly answered the
manipulation check question (N=635). Table C1 in the Appendix shows the subsample
demographic breakdown, along with political ideology, subjective social class, and
educational attainment for the full sample, compared to the manipulation check
subsample and each of the control and treatment groups. In Appendix Table C2, I also
show none of a variety of demographic and cognitive variables predicts assignment to
treatment groups in either the full sample or the reduced sample of participants who
answered the manipulation check question correctly. 21 The analysis presented in this
chapter is based on responses from participants who answered the manipulation check
question, although I show the average treatment effects for all participants in Appendix
Table C3.

4.2
4.2.1

Results of a Survey Experiment in Argentina
Satisfaction with Democracy, Average Treatment Effects
Table 4.1 shows the average treatment effects, or the mean response to the post-

treatment question about satisfaction with democracy, for each of the three treatment
groups compared to the control. On average, when participants only read a neutral
statement about the size of the economy in relation to other Latin American countries, the
average satisfaction with democracy response was 2.85 on a 1 to 5 scale (5=very

21 The one exception is that in the reduced sample, women were slightly more likely to
be assigned to Treatment 2 (Inequality framed as unfair) compared to the control in a
multinomial logit model predicting treatment group.
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satisfied). When individuals receive additional information that inequality in Argentina
is increasing (Treatment 1), and that this increase in inequality represents an unfair
distributive outcome (Treatment 2), they indicate an average level of democratic
satisfaction that is significantly lower (10 and 6 percent changes, respectively) than the
control group. Figure 4.1 shows these results graphically.
The average treatment effects presented in Table 4.1 and Figure 4.1 are consistent
with prior research demonstrating that income inequality is associated with decreased
satisfaction, and they are consistent with Hypothesis 1: individuals are less likely to
support the political system when they perceive the income distribution in the country as
unfair. Moreover, these results suggest that perceptions of distributive unfairness are key
mechanisms linking economic inequality to political support. Compared to participants
who are only told that inequality in Argentina is increasing (Treatment 1), providing
additional information about distributive unfairness does not significantly diminish
political support further. That is, lower levels of satisfaction with democracy, in a context
of rising inequality, are the result of people perceiving distributive unfairness, and
providing the extra information in Treatment 2 does not offer participants any new or
conflicting information.
Table 4.1 Average Treatment Effects, Satisfaction with Democracy in Argentina
Control
ATE=2.85
N=157
Inequality
Inequality + Unfair
Inequality + Fair
ATE=2.59
ATE=2.62
ATE=2.67
N=133
N=154
N=140
Diff= -.26**
Diff= -.23*
Diff= -.18
Note: Two-tailed t-tests comparing each treatment to the control group *p<.10, **p<.05,
***p<.01
DV: How satisfied are you with the way democracy works in Argentina? 1=Very dissatisfied to
5=Very satisfied
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Yet, telling participants that rising inequality in Argentina represents a fair
distributive outcome does affect political support differently, compared to only telling
people that inequality is on the rise. In fact, participants receiving Treatment 3 expressed
levels of satisfaction with democracy that were statistically indistinguishable from
participants in the control group who received no information about inequality. Stated
differently, on average, when people are given identical information about the economy
and income inequality, political support does not suffer when rising inequality is framed
as a fair distributive outcome.

Figure 4.1 Inequality Information and Satisfaction with Democracy
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4.2.2

Satisfaction with Democracy, Heterogeneous Effects by Political Ideology
In Chapter 2, I also developed hypotheses that political ideology should condition

the relationship between inequality, fairness perceptions, and political support. Insights
from literature on the moral foundations of political ideology suggest that those on the
political left should be more moralize outcomes they perceive as harmful or unfair to
others (e.g., Graham et al 2009; 2012). Conversely, research on political ideology and
system justification (Jost et al. 2003; Jost, Federico, and Napier 2009) suggests that those
on the right should be more likely to rely on system legitimizing narratives that support
the economic status quo, such as stereotypes that the poor are lazy and undeserving or
economic wellbeing is a sign of hard work rather than luck. The fairness frames that I
used in Treatments 2 and 3 were designed to tap these two different ideas. In Treatment
2, which should resonate more with people on the political left compared to the right,
inequality is framed as unfair because it diminishes equality of opportunity and harms
children, one of the most vulnerable groups in society. In Treatment 3, inequality is
framed as fair because it rewards hardworking individuals and creates opportunities for
economic success. I expect such narratives will appeal more to individuals on the right of
the political spectrum compared to the left.
To investigate heterogeneous effects by political ideology, I turn to regression
analysis. I create a dummy variable for each experimental treatment group, and then use
these dummy variables (excluding the control group dummy as the reference category),
to predict satisfaction with democracy. I then interact each of the treatment dummy
variables with participants’ political ideology. Additionally, I include controls for
subjective social class, sex, political interest, preference for state involvement in the
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economy, and education. Although including control variables can reduce the precision
of my estimated treatment effects, Robinson and Jewell (1991) recommend this approach
to increase the efficiency of hypothesis tests. Table C4, Models 1 and 2 in the appendix
shows the results of the regression analysis for participants who answered the
manipulation check question correctly. None of the coefficients on the interactions
between treatment and ideology is significant in Table C4, but I nevertheless follow the
advice of Brambor, Clark, and Golder (2006) and present the interactions graphically.
The point estimates in Figure 4.2 are expected values of the satisfaction with
democracy dependent variable based on the OSL regression results in Appendix Table
A.4.4. Overlapping bars around the point estimates indicate that predicted probabilities
Figure 4.2 Political Ideology, Fairness Perceptions, and Predicted Satisfaction

Note: Point estimated are predicted values from the OLS model in Appendix Table C4.
Overlapping bars around point estimates indicate that predicted values are not significantly
different at the 95% confidence level (Julious 2004).
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are not significantly different at the 95 percent confidence level. 22 Point estimates on the
left are for participants who indicated that their political ideology is less than 5 on a 0 to
10 left-right scale. Estimates on the right are for participants who indicated an
ideological placement greater than 5. Although the predicted values of the DV are not
significantly different (p<.05) within each respective panel (most likely due to the small
number of observations in each cell after participants who answered the manipulation
check incorrectly are excluded from the analysis), some important patterns emerge that
nonetheless are consistent with Hypothesis 3. When individuals on the left of the political
spectrum are presented with information about inequality, their predicted satisfaction
with democracy drops by .31 points compared to the control group (difference significant
at p=.12). This drop in predicted satisfaction is almost the same whether inequality is
framed as an unfair or fair outcome (differences from control are significant p<.10 for
Treatment 2 and Treatment 3). 23
Although it is possible that that lack of statistically significant differences
between predicted values in Figure 4.2 is the result of a small number of observations in
each treatment-by-ideology group, it is also important to consider the possibility that leftright political ideology in Argentina does not function the same way as it does in the
United States. Much of the literature I draw on in Chapter 2 to develop Hypothesis 3 is

22 As Julious (2004) explains, overlapping 84% confidence intervals indicate that we
cannot reject the null hypothesis of two predicted values being the same at the 95%
confidence level.
23 Tests of significantly different mean predicted values were conducted using the
“margins contrast” commands in Stata 15.1.
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based on research in the United States, where left-right semantics are more stable than
they are in many Latin American countries (Zechmeister 2006; 2015). Nevertheless,
results from a survey experiment in United States, discussed in the next section, exhibit a
similar overall pattern for heterogeneous treatments effects by political ideology, with
statistically significant differences between predicted values.
4.2.3

Satisfaction with Democracy, Heterogeneous Treatment Effects by Class
In addition to political ideology, I also hypothesize that class-status should

condition the relationship between inequality, fairness perceptions, and political support.
In Chapter 2, I argue that upper-class individuals should be more likely to draw on
system legitimizing narratives to justify economic inequality, and that even when upperclass individuals perceive distributive unfairness, they should still be less likely than
lower-class individuals to express political dissatisfaction as a result. To test for
heterogeneous treatment effects, I turn again to regression analysis. As before, I estimate
an OLS regression model in which I use dummy variables for each experimental group
(excluding the control group as the reference category) to predict satisfaction with
democracy. I then interact each of these dummy variables with respondents’ subjective
social class, and include controls for political ideology, sex, political interest, and
education. Models 3 and 4 in Appendix Table C4 show the results from the regression
models that I used to generate and plot predicted democratic satisfaction for lower-class
and upper-class individuals in each of the experimental groups.
For lower-class individuals (subjective social class<3, or about 42 percent of
respondents), predicted satisfaction is significantly lower compared to the control in each
treatment mentioning inequality, regardless of whether inequality is framed as unfair or
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Figure 4.3 Class, Fairness Perceptions, and Predicted Satisfaction

Note: Point estimated are predicted values from the OLS model in Appendix Table C4.
Overlapping bars around point estimates indicate that predicted values are not significantly
different at the 95% confidence level (Julious 2004).

fair. When just told that inequality is increasing, lower-class participants’ predicted
satisfaction drops by .49 points compared to the control (difference p<.05). When told
that inequality is increasing and that this represents an unfair outcome, predicted
satisfaction drops by .54 points compared to the control (difference p<.01). When given
the opportunity to perceive inequality as a fair distributive outcome, lower-class
participants’ predicted satisfaction rebounds a bit, but is still .35 points lower than the
control (difference p=.06). For middle and upper-class individuals (subjective social
class ≥ 3, or approximately 58% of respondents), information about inequality, framed as
either an unfair or fair distributive outcome, has no discernable effect on predicted
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satisfaction. As the right panel in Figure 4.3 illustrates, the none of the differences
between predicted satisfaction in the control group and Treatment 1 (.20 decrease),
Treatment 2 (.12 decrease), and Treatment 3 (.04 decrease) are significant at conventional
levels.
These results are consistent with my expectation that upper-class individuals
should be less likely to perceive the income distribution as unfair. And, while I did not
find support for Hypothesis 2 – that the effect of perceived distributive unfairness will be
weaker among upper-class than lower-class individuals – in my cross-national analysis,
the results from this survey do lend support to this hypothesis. Although I observe a drop
in predicted satisfaction when all participants are presented with information about
inequality and distributive unfairness, these differences are much larger (and only
significant for) the lower-class individuals in the sample.

4.3

Results from a Survey Experiment in the United States
In the next two sections, I supplement my experimental results from Argentina

with results of a similar survey experiment that I previously fielded in Mexico and the
United States. The setup of this experiment was the same as in Argentina, with a control
group and three treatments; however, the wording of vignettes was slightly different in
the prior experiments. See Appendix 3 for the exact wording of each treatment from the
2017 U.S. experiment (in English) and the 2018 Mexico experiment (in Spanish). Also,
although the post-treatment question in the Argentina experiment was about satisfaction
with democracy, the U.S. and Mexico experiments ask about trust in government. While
this means that results from these three experiments are not directly comparable, recall

95

from the cross-national analysis that when it comes to the relationship between
inequality, perceived distributive unfairness, and political support, results were
remarkable similar whether using trust in government or satisfaction with democracy as a
dependent variable.
In March 2017, I administered a survey experiment to roughly 1,500 U.S.
participants using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (hereafter referred to as MTurk) platform.
MTurk samples are increasingly used in the social sciences and they are shown to be just
as (if not more) representative than other internet-based survey platforms (Buhrmester,
Kwang, and Gosling 2011), and have been used to replicate a number of well-known
political science experiments (Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz 2012).
Table 4.2 Trust in Government, Average Treatment Effects, U.S Experiment
Control Group: Only information about the economy (EI)
Trust=2.38
N=355
Treatment 1: EI+
Treatment 2: EI + Inequality + Treatment 3: EI + Inequality
Inequality
Unfair
+ Fair
Trust=2.21
Trust=2.21
Trust=2.29
Difference: -.17**
Difference: -.17**
Difference: -.09
N=350
N=361
N=346
Note: **p<.01, *p<.05. Two-tailed tests of significance. DV: 1-5, 5 = “Always” trust
T-tests represent a series of comparisons between the control group and each of the treatment
groups. On average, individuals report significantly lower levels of trust in government
(compared to the control group) when told that economic inequality is increasing (and that this is
an unfair outcome). However, when told that inequality represents a “fair” outcome, average
levels of trust are indistinguishable from those in the control group, who only receive information
about the economic recovery.

Table 4.2 shows the average effect for each of the three treatments, compared to
the control. On average, people expressed lower levels of trust in government when they
perceive high inequality, that is, they attribute blame for inequality to the government.
These results are consistent with my main theoretical argument that perceived distributive
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unfairness undermines support for the political system. Compared to people who are
only told that inequality is increasing (Treatment 1), providing additional information
about unfairness does not diminish political support. While this may appear
counterintuitive, it is in line with my theoretical expectation that perceptions of
distributive unfairness are causal factors linking inequality to political support. That is to
say, the lower levels of government trust are the result of people perceiving distributive
unfairness. High levels of inequality represent a system in which unfair government
policies benefit a small group of wealthy citizens at the expense of everyone else. The
results from this survey experiment are consistent with themes that emerged from
qualitative survey data I collected in the US:
“[The cause of inequality is an] unfair income distribution. Programs that help the
disadvantaged and the poor being cut to save money and lower taxes, which
disproportionately helps the wealthy. Fewer and fewer programs being offered to
help the poor.”

“The government not regulating things properly and taxing people unfairly.”

“Unfair wages matching current inflation. Greedy businessmen who cut corners
by reducing employee benefits and pay. Rich people not paying their fair share of
taxes.”

As in the Argentina experiment, providing the extra information in Treatment 2
does not offer participants any new or conflicting information. However, telling people
that rising inequality is fair does have an additional effect on political support. People
receiving Treatment 3 expressed slightly lower levels of trust in government compared to
the control group, but the difference is not statistically significant (p=.18). Thus, on
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average, when people are given identical information about economic performance and
rising inequality, political support does not suffer nearly as much when people are told
that inequality represents a fair distributive outcome.
The fact that I observe political support rising when individuals are offered an
opportunity to perceive economic inequality as fair further supports the notion that
fairness perceptions are key factors linking high inequality to political dissatisfaction, as
well as research showing that individuals often rely on system justifying narratives when
they encounter information about inequality and distributive unfairness (Cassese and
Holman 2018; Jost et al. 2003; Kay and Jost 2003; Tyler 2006). Qualitative survey data
from the US again helps to contextualize this finding. Responses such as the following
appeared time and again in response to my open-ended question about the causes of
economic inequality in the United States:
“Poor people do not do anything to try and get their children out of poverty.
(some) Americans are lazy and believe that they can get by without applying
themselves.”
“Looking at it from the poor side of people, I think that these poor in our society
are lazy and complain a lot. They want to be spoon fed and blame everything on
everyone e.g., government, years of slavery, lack of jobs etc. This is what most
poor people think and believe. I think if they actually put their mind to it, they
could pull themselves out of poverty without complaining or blaming anyone.
That said, some of the rich are taking advantage of the poor in society and pinning
them down by not paying them well enough even when they publicly announce
the millions their companies make. I think the gap is so huge because the rich
have become so greedy and the poor have refused to rise up and get themselves
out of their predicament. It's really that simple. Thank you.”

These individuals may well recognize that inequality exists in society, and they recognize
that it can have negative consequences. However, human nature is largely to blame for
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growing levels of inequality. The government is not to blame for inequality, except to
the extent that it rewards laziness. If people would simply work harder, they could create
more economic opportunities for their children and themselves.
Although the results in Table 4.2 are informative, I am also interested in
heterogeneous treatment effects by political ideology (Hypothesis 3). As before, I
estimate baseline model and an interactive models predicting trust in government (see
Appendix Table C5). In each model, I include a dummy variable to indicate whether or
not an individual received each treatment (excluding the control group as the reference
category). I also include a measure for political ideology (coded 1-5; 5 = “Very
Conservative), and I control for class self-identification, education, sex (1 = “Female),
race (1= “White”; 0 = “Not White”), political interest, and personal economic situation
(1-5; 5 = “Much worse than a year ago”).
In order to investigate the possibility of heterogeneous treatment effects, I interact
each of the experimental treatment groups with the political ideology measure. I then use
the results from the interactive model to estimate a series of predicted probabilities, given
different combinations of experimental treatments and political ideology. I calculate and
plot a series of predicted probabilities in Figure 4.4 to aid in the substantive interpretation
of the heterogeneous treatment effects. Since so few individuals indicated that they can
“always” trust the government, regardless of treatment group, I calculate and plot the
probability of saying trust “most of the time” (response category 4) in Figure 4.4. Bars
around the point estimates indicate whether differences between predicted probabilities
are significant at the 95 percent level.
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Figure 4.4 Heterogeneous Treatment Effects by Political Ideology

Note: Point estimates represent the predicted probability that an individual will indicate trust in
government “most of the time” for individuals on the political left and right. Overlapping bars
indicate that predicted probabilities are not significantly different at the 95% CI (Julious 2004).

The first thing to notice in Figure 4.4 is that those on the left and on the right
respond similarly to Treatment 1. When told that inequality in the United States is rising,
participants expressed significantly lower levels of trust compared to those in the control
group. Yet, important differences arise regarding the treatments that mention fairness.
Those on the left receiving Treatment 3 expressed significantly lower levels of trust,
compared to those in the respective control group. For those on the right, however,
individuals receiving the third treatment (inequality + fair outcome) expressed levels of
trust that are indistinguishable from the control, and significantly higher than individuals
receiving the first treatment (inequality information only). For individuals on the right
receiving Treatment 1, their predicted probability of saying they trust the government
“most of the time” is only .06, compared to .11 for those receiving Treatment 3.
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Although I observe political support rising, on average, when people are given the
opportunity to perceive economic inequality as fair, this finding appears to be driven by
individuals on the right of the political spectrum. Recall, I theorized that conservatives,
or those on the political right, should be the most likely to rely on system justifying
ideologies and stereotypes in order to come to terms with objectively high levels of
inequality. Indeed, these results suggest that individuals on the right are more likely to
rely on legitimizing ideologies such as the “procedural fairness of the markets” (Tyler
2006) when forming their perceptions of distributive fairness and subsequent evaluations
of political support. The results here also reinforce the finding from Chapter 3 and
Hypothesis 3 that perceptions of distributive unfairness have less of an impact on political
support for those on the right, compared to those on the left.

4.4

Results from a Survey Experiment in Mexico
In February 2018, I administered a survey with embedded experimental

manipulations, in Spanish, to roughly 300 undergraduate students at a large university in
Mexico City. As with the U.S. experiment, the setup here consisted of a control and three
treatments. The exact wording of each vignette can be found in Appendix 2.
Table 4.3 shows the average effect for each of the three treatments, compared to
the control for my Mexico survey experiment. On average, participants expressed lower
levels of trust in government when they are told that inequality in Mexico is increasing
(Treatment 1) and that this represents an unfair distributive outcome (Treatment 2).
These results lend additional support for Hypothesis 1. Moreover, compared to
participants who are only told that inequality in Mexico is increasing (Treatment 1),
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providing additional information about distributive unfairness does not significantly
diminish political support further.
Table 4.3 Average Treatment Effects, Mexico Distributive Fairness Experiment
Control Group
ATE=2.00
N=57
Treatment 1
Treatment 2
Treatment 3
Inequality
Inequality Information +
Inequality Information +
Information
Unfair
Fair
ATE=1.77
ATE=1.74
ATE=1.97
N=78
N=72
N=61
Difference= -.23*
Difference= -.26*
Difference= -.03
Note: *p<.05, two-tailed t-tests with unequal variance comparing each treatment to the control
group. When presented with information about increasing inequality and/or distributive
unfairness, participants indicate significantly lower levels of trust in government compared to
individuals who only received information about the economy.

This finding supports my theory that perceptions of distributive unfairness are the
causal mechanisms linking economic inequality to political support. That is, lower levels
of trust in government, in a context of rising inequality, are the result of people
perceiving distributive unfairness, and providing the extra information in Treatment 2
does not offer participants any new or conflicting information. Yet, telling participants
that rising inequality in Mexico represents a fair distributive outcome does affect political
support differently, compared to only telling people that inequality is on the rise. In fact,
participants receiving Treatment 3 expressed levels of trust in government that were
nearly identical to participants in the control group who received no information about
inequality. Stated differently, on average, when people are given identical information
about the economy and income inequality, political support does not suffer when rising
inequality is framed as a fair distributive outcome. The fact that I observe political trust
rising when individuals are offered an opportunity to perceive economic inequality as fair
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further supports the notion that perceptions of distributive unfairness are important causal
factors linking high inequality to political dissatisfaction.
Turning one final time to my hypothesis about the conditioning effect of political
ideology, Table 4.4 present the average treatment effects for each treatment and control
group, broken down by ideological subsamples. As in the Argentina survey, I measure
political ideology using the same 0 to 10 left-right scale. For this analysis, I classify
participants who placed themselves between 0 and 4 on the scale as “left-leaning,” and
between 6 and 10 as “right-leaning.” Turning first to the left-leaning participants in the
top of Table 4.4, I show that the average treatment effects are all in a similar direction as
those for the entire sample. Participants receiving Treatments 1 and 2 all express
significantly lower levels of trust in government, compared to the control. Participants
receiving Treatment 3 expressed slightly lower levels of trust compared to the control,
but the difference is not statistically significant (p<.05). Although the difference between
treatments and the control for those on the left are all in the same direction, compared to
the full sample, the negative effect of perceived distributive unfairness is much stronger
for left-leaning respondents, as evident by the larger magnitude of the effect size (-.34
and -.43 for left-respondents compared to -.23 and -.26 for the full sample).
Turning to right-leaning participants on the bottom of Table 4.4, I show a number
of important differences compared to left-leaning participants. First, the magnitude of the
effect sizes for each Treatments 1 and 2 are much smaller than they are for those on the
left, or for the sample as a whole. Indeed, the differences between Treatments 1 and 2 are
statistically indistinguishable from the control. Although any statistically significant
results are difficult to detect with such a small sample size, power analysis indicates that I
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would need roughly 1,100 participants in each treatment group (total N=4,400) to observe
the even largest effect size as significant.
Table 4.4 Average Treatment Effects by Political Ideology, Mexico Experiment
Left-Leaning Participants (Ideology=0-4)
Control Group
ATE=1.97
N=35
Treatment 1
Treatment 2
Treatment 3
Inequality
Inequality Information +
Inequality Information+
Information
Unfair
Fair
ATE=1.63
ATE=1.54
ATE=1.75
N=44
N=37
N=28
Difference= -.34*
Difference= -.43*
Difference= -.19
Right-Leaning Participants (Ideology=6-10)
Control Group
ATE=2.08
N=12
Treatment 1
Treatment 2
Treatment 3
Inequality
Inequality Information +
Inequality Information+
Information
Unfair
Fair
ATE=2.05
ATE=2.00
ATE=2.18
N=19
N=17
N=16
Difference= -.03
Difference= -.08
Difference= .10
*p<.05, two-tailed t-tests with unequal variance comparing each treatment to the control group.
The panel on the top shows average treatment effects for the left-leaning (ideology=0-4)
subsample. Average treatment effects for the right-leaning (ideology=6-10) subsample are on the
bottom.

The second thing to notice for right-leaning participants is that the average
treatment effect for Treatment 3, where inequality is framed as a fair distributive
outcome, is actually larger compared to the control group. Again, although it is difficult
to detect statistically significant differences with such small samples, I also observe a
similar effect among conservative respondents in the U.S. version of this survey, with a
much larger sample size. Give the same finding in the U.S. and Argentina, I am more
confident that the results for my right-leaning participants in the Mexico sample are not
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the result of chance. Together, these finding lends support to Hypothesis 3, and they
bolster the finding from my cross-national analysis that the effect of perceived
distributive unfairness on trust is stronger for those on the left than those on the right.
Moreover, the results from the right-leaning subsample suggest that, consistent with my
theory, those on the right are more likely to rely on legitimizing ideologies such as the
“procedural fairness of the free market” (Tyler 2006) when forming their perceptions of
distributive fairness and subsequent evaluations of political support, and they reinforce
the finding from Chapter 3 (H3) that perceptions of distributive unfairness have less of an
impact on political support for those on the right, compared to those on the left.

4.5

Discussion and Conclusion
In this chapter, I used original survey experiments from Argentina, Mexico, and

the United States to isolate the impact of information and inequality and distributive
(un)fairness on support for the political system. Results from these survey experiments
demonstrate that when inequality is framed as an unfair distributive outcome, satisfaction
with democracy suffers. Yet, framing economic inequality as a fair distributive outcome
mitigates its negative impact on democratic satisfaction. This finding is consistent with
my main theoretical argument in Chapter 2, as well as with the cross-national relationship
highlighted in Chapter 3, that perceptions of distributive unfairness are negatively and
significantly associated with support for the political system.
Results from these survey experiments also reinforce my theoretical argument that
economic inequality and fairness perceptions impact political support differently
depending up individuals’ political ideology and class status. Turning first to
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individuals’ subjective social class, results from the regression analyses reveal that the
negative impact of inequality and perceived distributive unfairness is most acute among
lower-class individuals. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, however, information about
economic inequality and distributive unfairness has a negligible impact on democratic
satisfaction among individuals in the upper strata of society.
With regard to political ideology, the negative effect of information about
inequality on satisfaction with democracy was larger for those on the political left
compared to the right. And moreover, left-leaning individuals were not swayed by
attempts to frame inequality as a fair distributive outcome. When told that inequality is
increasing, regardless of whether framed as an unfair or fair distributive outcome, leftleaning individuals’ satisfaction with democracy declines by about 13 percent. For
individuals on the political right, however, information about inequality and distributive
unfairness have a more muted effect on satisfaction with democracy. And, when given
the opportunity to view inequality as a fair distributive outcome, right-leaning individuals
express levels of democratic satisfaction that are comparable to the control condition that
does not mention inequality at all. Taken together, these findings are consistent with
Hypothesis 3: The negative relationship between perceived distributive unfairness and
political support will be weakest among right-leaning individuals.
The fact that I observed stronger heterogenous treatment effects by political
ideology in the United States than in Argentina does suggest that left-right ideological
placement may work differently in Argentina compared to the U.S. Recall in Chapter 2
that I drew on three strands of literature to develop my hypothesis about the conditioning
role of political ideology (H3): moral foundations of political ideology, economic
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discourse about the role of the state in the economy, and system justification. Although
survey data presented in Chapter 1 suggests that citizens in Argentina overwhelming
believe the state should enact firm policies to reduce inequality, system justifying
ideologies about inequality may not map onto left-right semantics in Argentina as well as
they do in the United States.
My aim with the experiments in this chapter was to hold information about
inequality constant, within the context of single-country studies, so that I could isolate the
causal impact of fairness perceptions on satisfaction with democracy and trust in
government. The average treatment effects from this experiment suggest that perceived
distributive unfairness is one mechanism whereby inequality reduces support for the
political system. If economic inequality and perceived distributive unfairness were
unrelated phenomena that independently impact support for the political system, then we
should expect that providing information about both of these things should have a
compound negative effect on democratic satisfaction. This is not what we observe. In a
context of rising inequality, telling people that the income distribution is unfair does not
provide any new or conflicting information, on average. Yet, when individuals are given
the opportunity to reevaluate their perceptions of the income distributive and view
inequality through a lens of distributive unfairness, their support for the political system
rebounds.
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CHAPTER 5. AN EXPERIMENT ON INEQUALITY, CORRUPTION, AND
POLITICAL SUPPORT
5.1

Introduction
In Chapter 2, I developed a theoretical argument that in a context of good

governance, individuals should be less likely to perceive economic inequality as unfair,
and less likely to express political dissatisfaction as a result of perceived distributive
unfairness. The cross-national analysis in Chapter 3 was consistent with this argument.
When looking across Latin America, the negative relationship between perceived
distributive unfairness and different indicators of political support is weakest in a context
of good governance. In other words, in a context of good governance – as indicated by
low levels of corruption – individuals may well perceive their country’s income
distribution to be unfair, but the presence of good governance mitigates the negative
relationship between perceived distributive unfairness and support for the political
system.
In this chapter, I use an original survey experiment in Argentina to isolate the
causal effect of governance quality on the relationship between inequality and support for
the political system. This experiment was also embedded in the online survey described
at the beginning of Chapter 4. All participants not assigned to take part in the experiment
described in the previous chapter were assigned to take part in this experiment. In total,
1,577 participants from the online Netquest panel were assigned to receive one of the
treatments in this experiment. After excluding participants who failed a manipulation
check question later in the survey, the resulting sample size was N=624. As before, the
analysis in this chapter is only based on the subsample of participants who answered the

manipulation check question correctly. I include the average treatment effects for the full
sample in Appendix Tables D3 to D5. 24
My aim in designing the treatments for the present survey experiment was to hold
information about economic inequality constant, within the context of a single-country
study, and to vary information about two forms of corruption: bribery and theft of public
resources. Although the empirical analysis in Chapter 3 employed a broad measure of
governance quality that relies on expert perceptions of corruption, corruption can take
many forms, including bribery and outright theft (Desierto 2019), and its scope ranges
from petty corruption, generally on the part of low-level civil servants, to grand
corruption orchestrated by high-level public officials (Bauhr 2017; Graycar and Villa
2011).
In a context of high inequality, there is good reason to expect that corruption, an
important indicator of governance quality and procedural justice, shapes citizens’
judgments about distributive fairness and their subsequent evaluations of the political
system. Corruption-as-theft reduces the overall level of public resources that are
necessary to successfully enact pro-egalitarian social welfare programs. And, although
corruption-as-bribery does not diminish the total amount of public goods available for
redistribution, it challenges societal norms about equality of opportunity: “Even in cases
when governments cannot immediately reduce inequality, they can enact policies that
offer greater opportunities for economic equality” (Rothstein and Uslaner 2005, 47). As
an advisor to a National Deputy in Argentina noted, however, “The state is promoting

24 Results discussed in this section do not hold when participants who failed the
manipulation check are included in the analysis.
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lots of policies and projects to reduce inequality, but resources like houses and money
aren’t being given to the right people; they’re in the wrong hands because of
corruption.” 25 When programs meant to reduce inequality are not administered
impartially, the democratic government is not affording all citizens equal opportunities
for economic progress, and hence citizens should be more likely to express political
dissatisfaction for what they perceive as an unfair economic distribution.

5.2

Experimental Design
Individuals participating in this survey experiment were randomly assigned to

read one of six vignettes. They read that the incidence of [bribery/theft of public
resources] in Argentina has [remained the same/increased/decreased] in recent years, and
at the same time, the gap between the rich and poor in Argentina continues to grow
wider. The exact Spanish wording of each vignette can be found in Appendix Table D2.
After presenting participants with one of these six vignettes, I then asked post treatment
questions about satisfaction with democracy, trust in government, and perceptions of
distributive fairness.
Satisfaction with democracy: With this in mind, how satisfied are you with the
functioning of democracy in Argentina? Are you very dissatisfied (coded 1),
dissatisfied (2), neither dissatisfied nor satisfied (3), satisfied (4), or very satisfied
(5)?

Trust in government: And how much trust do you have in the national
government? Do you trust it not at all (coded 1), a little (2), somewhat (3), or a
lot (4)?

25 Author interview, June 2018.
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Perceptions of distributive unfairness: And how fair do you think the income
distribution is in Argentina? Do you believe it’s very fair (coded 1), fair (2),
unfair (3), or very unfair (4)?

Later in the survey, I asked all participants a manipulation check question: “In a
previous question, you read that corruption in Argentina has remained the same (coded
1), increased (2), or decreased (3). As mentioned above, only about 40 percent of
participants in this experiment answered the manipulation check question correctly. The
results discussed in the following sections are based on this subset of participations
Appendix Tables D3 to D5 show the average treatment effects for the full sample.
Appendix Tables D1 shows the sample characteristics for the full and reduced samples,
as well as each treatment group. Finally, Appendix Tables D6 and D7 show the results
from a multinomial logit predicting assignment to each treatment group.

5.3
5.3.1

Results
Inequality, Corruption, and Satisfaction with Democracy
In the next two sections, I use these experimental data to investigate the

relationship between economic inequality, governance quality, and support for the
political system. Although not a direct test of Hypothesis 4 – that good governance will
mitigate the negative influence of perceived distributive unfairness on political support –
I take as my starting point in this experiment the assumption that most individuals will
perceive increasing inequality as an unfair distributive outcome. Indeed, results from my
cross-national analysis In Chapter 3, as well as the survey experiment ion Chapter 4, are
consistent with this assumption. If my theoretical argument about inequality, governance
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quality, and political support is correct, then an observable implication of this argument is
that given the same information about inequality, individuals should be more satisfied
with democracy when corruption is decreasing, and less satisfied when corruption is
increasing.
Table 5.1 and Figure 5.1 show that average treatment effect, or average response
to the post-treatment question about satisfaction with democracy, for each experimental
group. Turning first to the participants who read about corruption-as-theft, the average
satisfaction with democracy response in the control group was 2.65, the same as the
baseline group that received no information about corruption or inequality. When
individuals read that both inequality and theft of public resources in Argentina have been
increasing in recent years, the average satisfaction response declines by .27 points to 2.38
(difference significant at p=.06 compared to the control).
Table 5.1 Average Treatment Effects, Satisfaction with Democracy
Baseline Satisfaction
w/Democracy=2.65
Theft of Resources
Same
Increasing
ATE=2.65
ATE=2.38
N=93
N=117
Diff= -.27*
Bribery
Same
Increasing
ATE=2.39
ATE=2.25
N=95
N=139
Diff= -.14

Decreasing
ATE=3.22
N=85
Diff= .57***
Decreasing
ATE=2.91
N=95
Diff=.53***

Note: Two-tailed T-tests comparing the corruption “increasing” and “decreasing” treatments to
the “same” treatment, “*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01.
DV: Satisfaction with democracy 1= “Very Dissatisfied” to 5= “Very satisfied”

Given the same information about rising inequality, however, the average
response to the question about satisfaction with democracy increases compared to the
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baseline and the control by .57 points to 3.22. The difference between the “theft
decreasing” and “theft increasing” experimental groups is perhaps even more impressive.
Given the same information about increasing inequality, which the cross-national results
in Chapter 3 consistently show is associated with perceived distributive unfairness,
participants’ satisfaction with the functioning of democracy is .85 points higher (35
percent high) when they read that corruption is decreasing rather than increasing. This
finding is consistent with my theoretical expectations about how governance quality
mitigates the negative influence of perceived distributive unfairness on support for the
political system. And moreover, this finding has important implications for democratic
stability and consolidation, which I discuss later.
Turning next to the corruption-as-bribery treatments, Table 5.1 shows a similar
pattern to the corruption-as-theft groups. Compared to the control group who read that
incidence of bribery have remained unchanged in recent years at the same time that
inequality is increasing, participants who read that both bribery and inequality were on
the rise indicated an average level of satisfaction with democracy equal to 2.25, or
slightly higher than “dissatisfied.” The difference in average treatment effects between
the control group and the “bribery increasing” group (-.14), however, is not significantly
different from 0 at conventional levels of significance (p=.31). A post-experiment power
analysis reveals that to observe this difference as statistically significant (p<.05), I would
have needed nearly 900 respondents per experimental group, well above the total number
in either the reduced sample of participants who answered the manipulation check
question correctly, or in the full sample which averaged about 250 respondents per
experimental group.
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Figure 5.1 Inequality, Corruption, and Satisfaction with Democracy

Note: *p<.10, **p<.05, ATE is different from the respective “corruption same” group.
DV: How satisfied are you with the way democracy functions? 1=V. dissatisfied, 5=V. satisfied.

The difference in average treatment effects between the control group and the
group reading that inequality is increasing but incidences of bribery are declining,
however, is statistically significant (p<.01) and in the expected direction. Indeed, this
.53-point increase in satisfaction with democracy is quite similar to that observed among
the corruption-as-theft participants. Also, compared to participants who read that both
bribery and inequality are increasing, participants who received the same information
about inequality but read that bribery is decreasing, satisfaction with democracy is .66
points higher, a roughly 30 percent and statistically significant (p<.01) increase. And
again, these results consistent with my theoretical expectation that good governance (as
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evidenced by declining levels of corruption) will mitigate the negative impact of
inequality and perceived distributive unfairness on support for the political system.
Finally, comparing the differences between the two “corruption decreasing” and
“corruption increasing” treatment effects suggests that when it comes to the relationship
between inequality and satisfaction with democracy, theft of public resources has a
stronger moderating effect on the relationship than bribery. As noted above, bribery
challenges societal norms about the equality of opportunity, but theft of public resources
directly hinders governments’ ability to enact pro-egalitarian reforms. Indeed, the
increase in satisfaction with democracy that results from moving from the respective
“corruption increasing” to the “corruption decreasing” treatment groups is .19 points
greater for the participants who read about theft of public resources compared to those
who read about bribery (differences significant p<.01).
5.3.2

Inequality, Corruption, and Trust in Government
In addition to satisfaction with democracy, I also asked participants in this

experiment a post-treatment question about trust in government. Table 5.2 and Figure 5.2
show the average treatment effects for participants in each experimental group. The
patterns in average treatment effects for the trust in government question are similar to
those for satisfaction with democracy, although the differences are not directly
comparable because the trust question uses a 4-point response scale, whereas the
satisfaction question uses a 5-point scale. Nevertheless, the pattern displayed in Table
5.2 and Figure 5.2 is again consistent with my argument that good governance mitigates
the negative influence of inequality and perceived distributive unfairness on support for
the political system.
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Table 5.2 Average Treatment Effects, Trust in Government
Theft of Resources
Same
Increasing
ATE=2.16
ATE=1.62
N=93
N=117
Diff= -.54***
Bribery
Same
Increasing
ATE=2.03
ATE=1.84
N=95
N=139
Diff= -.18

Decreasing
ATE=3.13
N=85
Diff= .97***
Decreasing
ATE=2.67
N=95
Diff= .64***

Note: Note: Two-tailed T-tests comparing the corruption “increasing” and “decreasing”
treatments to the “same” treatment, “*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01.
DV: Trust in government 1= “none” to 4= “a lot”

Turning first to the top panel in Table 5.2, when individuals read that theft of
public resources in Argentina has remained unchanged in recent years at the same time
that inequality is increasing, the average response to the question, “How much do you
trust the National Government” was 2.16 on a 1 to 4 scale, or slightly above “a little.”
When participants read that both corruption-as-theft and economic inequality have been
increasing in recent years, their average level of trust in government declines .54 points to
1.62 (difference from control is significant p<.01), or between “none” and “a little” trust.
When told that inequality is increasing but theft of resources is declining, the average
response to the trust in government question, compared to the control, increases nearly
one full scale point (difference from control is significant p<.01) to 3.13, between “some”
and “a lot” of trust. Comparing the “theft increasing” to the “theft decreasing” average
responses, the differences are even more striking. Given the same exact information and
increasing inequality, the average trust in government response is more than 1.5 points –
on a 4-point scale – when participants learn that corruption is decreasing compared to
when it is increasing. This is again consistent with my theoretical argument that good
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governance should mitigate the negative influence of inequality, and resulting
perceptions of distributive unfairness, on political support.
Figure 5.2 Inequality, Corruption, and Trust in Government

Note: *p<.10, **p<.05, ATE is different from the respective “corruption same” group.

The patterns in the bottom panel of Table 5.2 are also similar to the satisfaction
with democracy results in Table 5.1 and Figure 5.1. When told that inequality is
increasing and incidence of bribetaking have remained unchanged in recent years, the
average trust response is 2.03, or “a little.” When told both inequality and bribery are
increasing, trust in government declines to 1.85, although the difference compared to the
control is not significant at conventional levels (p=.11). The average level of trust in
government is 2.67 for participants reading that inequality is increasing but incidences of
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bribery are on the decline, compared to 2.03 for those in the control group. This
represent a .64 point increase in trust that is significantly different from the control
(p<.01). And again, the largest differences in average treatment effects is between the
“bribery decreasing” and “bribery increasing” groups. Given the same information about
rising inequality, the average level of trust in government is .82 points higher (p<.01)
when participants are told that bribery is decreasing, compared to when they are told
bribery is increasing.
5.3.3

Inequality, Corruption, and Perceived Distributive Unfairness
I do not develop explicit hypotheses in Chapter 2 about how economic inequality

and governance quality affect the formation of perceptions of distributive unfairness.
Nevertheless, a key part of the theoretical argument leading up to Hypothesis 4, and an
implication of literature on fairness and procedural justice theories (e.g., André and
Depauw 2017; Córdova and Layton 2016), is that individuals should draw on multiple
sources of information when forming their perceptions of distributive fairness. Thus,
good governance should lead people to respond less negatively to inequality in the first
place. To assess support for this part of my argument, I also included a post-treatment
question about perceptions of the fairness of the income distribution in Argentina. If this
part of my theoretical argument is correct, then in a context of rising inequality,
individuals should be less likely to say the income distribution is unfair when they are
presented with information about good governance, compared to a situation in which
governance quality remains unchanged or actually gets worse.
Table 5.3 shows the average treatment effects, or mean response to the posttreatment question about perceived distributive unfairness in Argentina. Recall that this
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question is coded such that 1 indicates “very fair” and 4 indicated “very unfair.” The
average treatment effects in Table 5.3 are generally consistent with the fairness and
procedural justice literature that I draw on in Chapter 2 to develop Hypothesis 4, although
theft of public resources and bribery clearly influence perceived distributive unfairness
differently.
Turning first to the vignettes that provide information about theft of public
resources, when told that amount of corruption has remained unchanged in recent years at
the same time that inequality is increasing (control), the average response to the question
about perceived distributive unfairness is 3.25. (between “unfair” and “very unfair”).
When told that both theft of public resources and inequality are increasing, the average
response inches closer to “very unfair” by .14 points, although the difference between
this mean response and the control is statistically insignificant at conventional levels
(p=.11). When told that theft of public resources is decreasing, however, participants
indicated that the income distribution is .35 points fairer compared to the control group
that received similar information about rising inequality (p<.01).
Table 5.3 Average Treatment Effects, Perceived Distributive Unfairness
Theft of Resources
Same
Increasing
Decreasing
ATE=3.25
ATE=3.39
ATE=2.89
N=93
N=117
N=85
Diff= .14
Diff= -.35***
Bribery
Same
Increasing
Decreasing
ATE=3.16
ATE=3.50
ATE=3.13
N=95
N=139
N=95
Diff= .34***
Diff= -.03
Note: Note: Two-tailed T-tests comparing the corruption “increasing” and “decreasing”
treatments to the “same” treatment, “*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01.
DV: How fair is the income distribution in Argentina? 1= “very fair” to 4= “very unfair”
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Turning next to the bribery vignettes, Table 5.3 show a similar pattern to the theft
vignettes. Compared to individuals who are told that inequality is increasing and that
incidence of bribery have remained the same in recent years, participants indicate that the
income distribution in Argentina is more unfair when told that incidence of bribery are
increasing, and that the income distribution is fairer when instance of bribery are
declining. Unlike in the “theft of resources” vignettes, however, the significant
difference from the control group is for the “bribery” increasing treatment, with these
participants indicating that the income distribution is .34 points more unfair compared to
the control.
Figure 5.3 shows the average treatment effects from Table 5.3 graphically. The
results in Figure 5.3 and Table 5.3 are wholly consistent with prior research on the Fair
Process Effect (e.g., Tyler & van der Toorn, 2013; van den Bos, Wilke, Lind, &
Vermunt, 1998), which implies that the relationship between inequality and perceived
distributive unfairness should be weaker in a context of good governance than one of
poor governance. In both sets of experiments, participants are the most likely to say that
the income distribution in their country is unfair when inequality and corruption are
simultaneously on the increase. Given the same context of rising inequality, however,
participants are significantly less likely to say that the income distribution is unfair when
corruption is declining, an indication that governance quality is better (i.e., the difference
between the corruption increasing and corruption decreasing treatments is significantly
different p<.001).
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Figure 5.3 Inequality, Corruption, and Perceived Distributive Unfairness

Note: *p<.10, **p<.05, ATE is different from the respective “corruption same” group. The
difference between each corruption “increasing” and “decreasing” groups is significant (p<.01) as
well. DV: Howe fair is the income distribution in Argentina? 1=Very Fair, 4=Very Unfair.

5.4

Discussion Conclusion
In this section, I discussed the results from an original survey experiment in

Argentina in which I isolated the effect of corruption – the main indicator of governance
quality that I use in this dissertation – on support for the political system. First, I showed
that given identical information about rising inequality, individuals are less likely to say
the income distribution is unfair when corruption is decreasing, as opposed to increasing
or remaining unchanged. Although I did not develop hypotheses about the relationship
between inequality and individuals’ perceptions of the income distribution in Chapter 2,
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the findings in this survey experiment are consistent with a large body of literature on
social justice and fairness theories. In particular, research on the Fair Process Effect
(e.g., Tyler & van der Toorn, 2013; van den Bos, Wilke, Lind, & Vermunt, 1998)
suggests that governance quality should shape people’s expectations about the outcomes
they receive and their responses to any distributive unfairness they may experience.
Results from this survey experiment also show that governance quality conditions
the relationship between inequality and individuals’ support for the political system.
Given identical information about rising inequality in Argentina, participants in this
experiment expressed higher levels of satisfaction with democracy and trust in
government when they read that bribery and the theft of public resources have been on
the decline in recent years, compared to those who read that corruption has been
increasing or remaining constant.
While this finding is not an exact test of Hypotheses 4, that governance quality
should mitigate the negative relationship between perceived distributive unfairness and
political support, it is largely consistent with my theoretical arguments leading up to this
hypothesis. Both cross-national survey data and qualitative data from the U.S. and
Argentina support the assumption that most individuals view inequality through a lens of
distributive unfairness, and that they attribute blame for this perceived unfair outcome to
the government. In a context of good governance, the negative effect of inequality, and
by extension perceptions of unfairness, is significantly reduced.
One limitation of this study is that I am not able to assess how different
combinations of inequality and governance information affect support for the political
system. The results discussion above assumes that the combination of good governance
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and decreasing inequality should have the most positive impact on individuals’ political
evaluations, but I am not actually able to test this part of the argument with my
experimental design. Indeed, it is possible that individuals in Argentina care more about
corruption than inequality, and that improvements or shortcomings in governance quality
outweigh any information about inequality, at least when it comes to satisfaction with
democracy and trust in government. Although my theoretical arguments developed in
Chapter 2 do not suggest that this should be the case, I cannot assess this part of the
argument empirically at the current time.
The empirical results in this chapter advance prior scholarly work on the topic of
inequality and political support. Prior research has demonstrated a robust cross-national
correlation between economic inequality and satisfaction with democracy (Anderson and
Singer 2008) and political trust (Cordova and Layton 2016; Zmerli and Castillo 2015).
Results from this survey experiment shed new light on the specific contexts under which
inequality can be expected to reduce trust with the political system. That good
governance, such as declining levels of corruption, can offset the negative influence of
inequality on support for democratic institutions has important implications for both
policy and democratic stability more generally in the Americas. I discuss these broader
implications in more detail in the final chapter of this dissertation.
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION

Political support, such as satisfaction with democracy and trust in government, is
at troubling low levels and has been steadily declining during the last decade in a number
of countries throughout the Americas. In Brazil, for instance, recent high-profile
corruption scandals coupled with a severe economic recession have left citizens
disillusioned with their democratic institutions. 26 Conversely, while systematic corruption
in Latin America continues to “widen and deepen social fissures, exacerbate inequality,
and impede the efficacy of both public and private investment,” recent efforts to crack
down on corruption in Argentina have been accompanied by a modest uptick in
institutional trust (World Economic Forum 2018, 7). Prior research has linked
dissatisfaction and disenchantment with democratic institutions to weak state capacity
and poor governance (Anderson and Tverdova 2003; Kumlin and Esaisson 2012;
Mainwaring 2006; Weitz-Shapiro 2008), legislative gridlock (Singh and Carlin 2015),
and economic inequality (Anderson and Singer 2008). I advance these scholarly lines of
inquiry by using a mixed-methods approach to examine the conditions under which
inequalities in society translate into political dissatisfaction.

6.1

Summary of the Argument and Main Findings
In Chapter 2 of this dissertation, I developed a theoretical argument that

perceptions of distributive unfairness are key factors whereby inequalities in society

26 https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/in-brazil-nostalgia-grows-forthe-dictatorship--not-the-brutality-but-the-law-and-order/2018/03/14/bc58ded2-1cdd11e8-98f5-ceecfa8741b6_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.c7fe0436d084

translate into political dissatisfaction. Extreme inequality challenges citizens’ normative
expectations about the outcomes that democracy is supposed to deliver in practice (Singh
and Carlin 2015; Meltzer and Richards 1981). When individuals view inequality as an
unfair outcome resulting from the (in)action of democratic government, their political
support is likely to suffer. In addition to my expectation that all individuals should be
less satisfied with democracy and less likely to trust the government when they perceive
high levels of distributive unfairness in society, I also expect that certain groups of
individuals – i.e., upper-class citizens and those on the right of the political spectrum –
are more likely to “cognitively adjust” to or rationalize inequality (Jost et al. 2003, Tyler
2006), and hence should be less likely to blame the government for any perceived
distributive unfairness they experience. Additionally, I developed an argument that
governance quality should mitigate the negative influence of perceived distributive
unfairness on political support, albeit for different reasons than the individual-level
factors that condition this relationship. In a context of good governance, as evidenced by
low corruption, for example, citizens are presented with alternative evidence that the
democratic process is functioning properly. Individuals may well perceive the income
distribution to be unfair, but the presence of good governance should signal to citizens
that democracy is nevertheless the most legitimate vehicle for addressing inequality.
To test my expectations, used a mixed-methods approach and leveraged large-N
cross-national survey data and original survey experiments. Table 6.1 summarizes the
support for each hypothesis offered by each empirical component of the dissertation. In
Chapter 3, I used a multilevel analysis of Latinobarometer survey data from 18 Latin
American countries between 2011 and 2015 to test the hypotheses I developed in Chapter
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2. Consistent with my main theoretical argument and Hypothesis 1, I found that
perceptions of distributive unfairness were significantly and negatively correlated with
both satisfaction with democracy and trust in government.
Table 6.1 Summary of Empirical Support for Hypotheses
Hypothesis
H1: On average, citizens who perceive the distribution of
income in their country as unfair will express lower levels of
political support than individuals who view the income
distribution as fair.

Ch.
3

Ch.
4

Yes

Yes

H2: The negative relationship between perceived distributive
unfairness and political support will be weakest among upperclass individuals.
H3: The negative relationship between perceived distributive
unfairness and political support will be weakest among rightleaning individuals.
H4: Good governance will weaken the negative relationship
between perceived distributive unfairness and political support.

Ch.
5

Partial

Partial Partial

Yes

Yes

Although I did not find support for my expectation that individuals’ class status
should condition the relationship between fairness perceptions and political support (H2),
I did find partial support for my argument that being on the right of the political spectrum
(H3) should weaken the negative influence of perceived distributive unfairness on
political support. Hypothesis 3 was supported to the extent that when it comes to
satisfaction with democracy and trust in government, fairness judgments simply matter
less for those on the right of the political spectrum compared to the left. That the
satisfaction and trust gaps between those who view the income distribution as “fair”
compared to “unfair” narrows considerably on the right of the ideological spectrum is
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consistent with research on the moral foundations of political ideology, which posits that
liberals are more likely than conservatives to moralize outcomes that they perceive as
unfair or harmful to others. However, the fact that predicted political support among
individuals who perceive the income distribution as “very unfair” is the same across the
political spectrum challenges my argument that right-leaning individuals rely on system
justifying narratives when making political evaluations about inequality and distributive
unfairness, at least in Latin America. Finally, results from my cross-national analysis
were wholly consistent with my argument that good governance should mitigate the
negative influence of perceived distributive unfairness on support for the political system
(H4).
In Chapter 4, I used a original survey experiments in Argentina, Mexico, and the
United States to isolate the causal effects of distributive (un)fairness on political support.
Given identical information about rising inequality, individuals were much more
supportive of the political system when inequality was framed as a fair distributive
outcome. When participants were told that rising inequality represents an unfair
distributive outcome, their satisfaction with democracy and trust in government declined,
but to the same low level as participants who received information about inequality but
no unfairness frame. This finding suggests that, consistent with my main theoretical
argument, inequality leads to political dissatisfaction because individuals view inequality
as an unfair distributive outcome resulting from the inaction of democratic government.
Telling individuals that inequality is unfair does not provide them with any new or
conflicting information. When using a system-justifying narrative to reframe inequality
as a fair outcome, however, political support in the face of inequality rebounds. The
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main analysis in Chapter 4 centered around a survey experiment I conducted in Argentina
in February 2019. However, the fact that I find similar results across time and in Mexico
as well as the United States speaks to the generalizability and external validity of my
findings.
In Chapter 5, I turned to a second original survey experiment that I fielded in
Argentina to examine how different forms of corruption – the main indicator of
governance quality that I use in this dissertation – affect the relationship between
inequality and political support. While not a direct test of the hypotheses I developed in
Chapter 2, insights from qualitative survey data and the experiment in Chapter 4 lend
support to my assumption that when presented with information about rising inequality,
most individuals will perceive it to be an unfair distributive outcome. Results from
Chapter 5 are consistent with my argument that good governance mitigates the negative
influence of inequality and perceived distributive unfairness on support for the political
system. Given identical information about rising inequality, participants indicated
significantly higher levels of satisfaction with democracy and trust in government when
they learn that corruption is decreasing rather than increasing or remaining unchanged.
That good governance is able to mitigate the negative influence of distributive injustice
on support for the political system has important policy implications for countries in
Latin America, where inequality is persistent and higher than any other region in the
world.
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6.2

Contributions
This dissertation contributes to the literature on inequality and political support in

two important ways, and beyond its theoretical and empirical contributions, has a number
of broader implications for policy and democratic stability. One important contribution of
this dissertation is that I investigate factors giving rise to the frequently documented
connection between economic outcomes and political support. Although prior research
has demonstrated a robust empirical correlation between economic inequality and support
for the political system (e.g., Anderson and Singer 2008; Córdova and Seligson 2010;
Córdova and Layton 2016; Krieckhaus et al. 2014; Zmerli and Castillo 2015), this
research has yet to fully unpack the psychological mechanisms linking aggregate-level
inequality to individual-level evaluations of democracy. In this dissertation, I argue that
individuals’ perceptions of distributive fairness are key to understanding the previously
documented correlation between inequality and political support. Empirically, I use a
combination of observational and original experimental research methods to test this
theoretical argument.
Another contribution is that I draw upon social justice theories to derive new
hypotheses about how people formulate fairness judgments and use these judgments to
evaluate democratic governments. Specifically, I apply social psychology research on
social justice and fairness theories to the study of political support and shows that citizens
rely on information about distributive fairness (i.e., the fairness of economic outcomes) as
well as noneconomic information about government policies and procedures, when
evaluating the political system.
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Beyond these theoretical contributions, my findings have a number of broader
implications for policy and democratic stability. Given the tenuous levels of political
support in countries suffering from high inequality, such as those in Latin America,
understanding why inequality reduces political support is key to finding ways to restore
trust in government and satisfaction with democracy.

6.3

Broader Implications
Poverty and distributive unfairness are widespread problems that have the

potential to undermine not only support for the political system, but also political
engagement and participation (Holzner, 2010; Solt, 2008). People care a great deal about
fairness, and when they perceive patently unfair outcomes, such as an unfair distribution
of wealth or income, they are less likely to be satisfied with their democratic government.
On the one hand, this may be troubling for the prospects of democratic consolidation in
regions such as the Americas: despite some recent declines in inequality, citizens across
Latin America overwhelmingly perceive their countries’ income distributions as unfair.
As my research shows, high levels of perceived distributive unfairness harm satisfaction
with democracy, and thus undermine the widespread democratic “buy-in” that is crucial
for democracy to consolidate (Linz & Stepan, 1996).
Yet, my findings also provide some room for optimism, and they speak to broader
themes in the literature on governance quality and corruption more generally. By
delivering quality governance—for instance, by combatting corruption—political
authorities in democracies can effectively offset the negative influence of perceived
distributive unfairness on political support, even in a context of high inequality. One way
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to effectively combat corruption is to enhance political accountability. A study of local
governments in Brazil, for instance, found significantly less corruption in municipalities
where mayors were eligible for reelection (Ferraz and Finan 2011). Political authorities
can also establish independent oversight organizations, such as audit institutions (Melo,
Pereira, and Figueiredo 2009).
Literature on governance quality and gender and politics has also suggested that
incorporating more women into governmental office could prove a successful anticorruption reform. There is a robust and negative correlation between the presence of
women in government and corruption (Esarey and Chirillo 2013; Dollar, Fisman, and
Gatti 2001; Swamy et al. 2001) that prior research has documented in legislative
institutions (Stensöta, Wängnerud, and Svensson 2015) and in democracies with high
electoral accountability (Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer 2018). Moreover, women’s
descriptive representation (Watson and Moreland 2014), as well as formal representation
in the form of gender quotas (Schwindt-Bayer 2010), is associated with reduced
suspicions of corruption among citizens. These findings are bolstered by more recent
research showing women to be less corrupt than men (Bauhr, Charron, & Wängnerud,
2018; Wängnerud 2012), as well as evidence from survey experiments (Barnes, Beaulieu,
& Saxton 2018) showing that citizens believe increasing women’s presence in
government is successful for reducing corruption. Beyond bolstering satisfaction with
democracy, low levels of corruption signal to citizens that government is not dominated
by elites, that the democratic process is functioning properly, and that policies are being
made and administered via fair, impartial, and transparent procedures. In sum,
democratic governments and political elites can foster accountability, transparency, and
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rule of law. When fair procedures for governing are in place, citizens may still perceive
unfair distributive outcomes, but they are more likely to also believe that democracy is
the most legitimate vehicle for addressing their country’s most pressing concerns. As
such, my findings suggest that initiatives aimed at reducing corruption, such as increasing
the presence of historically marginalized groups in politics, could help bolster political
support in the face of unfair distributive outcomes.
My findings also have important implications for political elites and elite
discourse in the Americas. The results in Chapter 4 demonstrate that when framed as a
fair distributive outcome, inequality has less of a negative impact on political support
than when framed as unfair or when individuals are left to make their own fairness
judgments about rising inequality. This is not to suggest that if political elites simply tell
the masses that rising inequality is justifiable and fair, ordinary citizens will readjust their
expectations about democracy. Rather, it suggests that policy makers need to do a better
job communicating to citizens what they are doing to try and combat poverty and
inequality. When I was speaking with political elites in Argentina, for example, a
frequent theme that emerged from my interviews was the ordinary citizens do not trust
the legislature because they are not aware what their representatives actually do. As a
senator from Buenos Aires Province told me,
“People don’t know anything about the legislature. They don’t even know what
goes on in this building. But, things are getting much better with this government
because they are trying to be transparent and communicate both the problems that
the country is facing as well as what it’s doing to solve them.” 27

27 Author interview, Senator for Buenos Aires province (Cambiemos), March 2019.
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It is hard for citizens to trust their democratic institutions, such as the legislature, in the
face of economic inequality when they view the political class unfavorably and have no
idea whether or not their representatives are promoting their policy interests. But, when
political elites can credibly signal to ordinary citizens that they are committed to
combatting persistent poverty and inequality in society, individuals may still perceive the
income distribution to be unfair or even very unfair, yet their political concerns should be
allayed when they see their democratic government as the most legitimate vehicle for
addressing distributive injustice.
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APPENDICES

Appendix A. Chapter 2 Supplementary Analysis
Table A1. System Justifying Attitudes Predict Ideology (0=Left, 10=Right)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Inequality is justified
.12***
(.01)
People should take responsibility
.06***
(.01)
Competition is good
.01
(.01)
Hard work brings success
.02
(.01)
Wealth accumulation is good
Statist economic preference
Political Interest
Religiosity
Income
Female
Age
Education
Support for Democracy
Country Fixed Effects
Brazil
Chile
Ecuador
Mexico
Peru

(5)

.01
(.01)
-.01
(.03)
-.07***
(.01)
.03*
(.02)
.08
(.06)
.00*
(.00)
-.06***
(.01)
-.19***
(.04)

.01
(.01)
-.02
(.03)
-.07***
(.01)
.03*
(.02)
.07
(.06)
.00*
(.00)
-.06***
(.01)
-.20***
(.04)

.00
(.01)
-.02
(.03)
-.08***
(.01)
.04**
(.02)
.05
(.06)
.00*
(.00)
-.06***
(.01)
-.24***
(.04)

.00
(.01)
-.02
(.03)
-.07***
(.01)
.04*
(.02)
.06
(.06)
.00*
(.00)
-.06***
(.01)
-.22***
(.04)

.03**
(.01)
.01
(.01)
-.02
(.03)
-.07***
(.01)
.04*
(.02)
.07
(.06)
.00*
(.00)
-.06***
(.01)
-.21***
(.04)

-.32**
(.12)
-.01
(.14)
-.06
(.12)
.65***
(.11)
-.05

-.22
(.12)
-.08
(.15)
-.00
(.12)
.74***
(.12)
.06

-.32**
(.12)
-.11
(.15)
.00
(.12)
.69***
(.12)
.06

-.28*
(.12)
-.09
(.15)
.03
(.12)
.72***
(.12)
.08

-.31*
(.12)
-.09
(.15)
.03
(.12)
.70***
(.12)
.06

Uruguay
Constant
Observations
R2

(.12)
(.12)
(.12)
(.12)
(.12)
-.78*** -.74*** -.74*** -.69*** -.72***
(.14)
(.14)
(.14)
(.14)
(.14)
5.71*** 6.08*** 6.46*** 6.28*** 6.14***
(.25)
(.25)
(.25)
(.25)
(.26)
6881
6880
6831
6865
6814
.06
.05
.05
.04
.04

* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 (standard errors). OLS regression coefficients predicting political ideology
(0=left to 10=right). For country fixed effects, Argentina is excluded as the reference category.
Note: Three of the five system justifying attitudes are significant predictors of rightist political ideology.
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APPENDIX B. Chapter 3 Supplementary Analysis

Figure B1. Distribution of Unfairness Perceptions by Political Ideology

Note: This figure shows the distribution of perceived distributive unfairness across the
political ideology spectrum. Responses are from the 2015 Latinobarometer and are
pooled across all countries. Figure B1 suggests that those on the political right are just
as likely as those on the left to perceive the income distribution as unfair in Latin
America, although the cross-national analysis in this chapter shows that, consistent with
Hypothesis 3, the relationship between perceived distributive unfairness and support for
the political system is weaker on the right side of the political spectrum.

Figure B2. Distribution of Governance Quality in Latin America

Note: This figure shows the distribution of governance quality (control of corruption
measure) in the Latin American countries in this sample. Higher values indicate better
governance, or less corruption. Although the modal level of governance quality is on the
“poor” side of the spectrum, there is still significant variation across the country-years
being analyzed in Chapter 3.
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Table B1. Perceived Unfairness and Satisfaction, Alternative Governance Measures
Voice and
Government
Rule of Law
Accountability
Effectiveness
Perceived
-.57*** -.48***
-.57***
-.60***
-.57***
-.54***
Unfairness
(.04)
(.04)
(.04)
(.03)
(.04)
(.04)
Governance
.27**
-.12
.39**
-.11
.25*
-.13
Quality
(.10)
(.13)
(.13)
(.17)
(.12)
(.16)
Unfair X
.19***
.23***
.19***
Governance
(.05)
(.06)
(.06)
Individual-Level
Political Ideology
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
0-10=Right
(.00)
(.00)
(.00)
(.00)
(.00)
(.00)
Subjective Social
.07***
.07***
.07***
.07***
.07***
.07***
Class
(.01)
(.01)
(.01)
(.01)
(.01)
(.01)
Economic
-.42*** -.42***
-.42***
-.42***
-.42***
-.42***
Perception Worse
(.01)
(.01)
(.01)
(.01)
(.01)
(.01)
Education
-.01*** -.01***
-.01***
-.01***
-.01***
-.01***
(.00)
(.00)
(.00)
(.00)
(.00)
(.00)
Rural
.04
.04
.04
.04
.04
.05
(.03)
(.03)
(.03)
(.03)
(.03)
(.03)
Incumbent
.80***
.80***
.80***
.80***
.80***
.80***
Approval
(.02)
(.02)
(.02)
(.02)
(.02)
(.02)
Wealth Quintile
.01
.01
.01
.01
.01
.01
(.01)
(.01)
(.01)
(.01)
(.01)
(.01)
Female
-.03
-.03
-.03
-.03
-.03
-.03
(.02)
(.02)
(.02)
(.02)
(.02)
(.02)
Country-Level
Income Inequality
-.11*** -.11***
-.11***
-.11***
-.12***
-.12***
(.02)
(.02)
(.02)
(.02)
(.02)
(.02)
Observations
40620
40620
40620
40620
40620
40620
Country-Years
54
54
54
54
54
54
2
4047.55 4197.03 4049.40
4179.57
4044.41
4145.95
Wald Chi
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 (Standard errors). Multilevel ordered logit coefficients.
Note: Results in Table B1 show that the findings in Chapter 3 are robust to other measures of
governance quality, including WGI measures of Rule of Law, Voice and Accountability, and
Government Effectiveness.
DV: How satisfied are you with the way democracy functions in your country? 1=very
dissatisfied to 4=very satisfied.
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Table B2. Perceived Unfairness and Trust, Alternative Governance Measures
Voice and
Government
Rule of Law
Accountability
Effectiveness
Perceived
-.50*** -.42*** -.50***
-.52***
-.50***
-.47***
Unfairness
(.05)
(.05)
(.05)
(.04)
(.05)
(.05)
Governance Quality
.15*
-.30
.15
-.45
.18*
-.32
(.07)
(.19)
(.10)
(.24)
(.09)
(.23)
Unfair X
.16**
.21**
.17*
Governance
(.06)
(.08)
(.07)
Individual-Level
Political Ideology 0- -.01*** -.01*** -.01***
-.01***
-.01***
-.01***
10=Right
(.00)
(.00)
(.00)
(.00)
(.00)
(.00)
Subjective Social
.06*** .06***
.06***
.06***
.06***
.06***
Class
(.01)
(.01)
(.01)
(.01)
(.01)
(.01)
Economic
-.39*** -.39*** -.39***
-.39***
-.39***
-.39***
Perception Worse
(.01)
(.01)
(.01)
(.01)
(.01)
(.01)
Education
-.01*** -.01*** -.01***
-.01***
-.01***
-.01***
(.00)
(.00)
(.00)
(.00)
(.00)
(.00)
Rural
.05*
.05*
.05*
.05*
.05*
.05*
(.03)
(.03)
(.03)
(.03)
(.03)
(.03)
Incumbent Approval 1.54*** 1.54*** 1.54***
1.54***
1.54***
1.54***
(.02)
(.02)
(.02)
(.02)
(.02)
(.02)
Wealth Quintile
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
(.01)
(.01)
(.01)
(.01)
(.01)
(.01)
Female
-.04*
-.04*
-.04*
-.04*
-.04*
-.04*
(.02)
(.02)
(.02)
(.02)
(.02)
(.02)
Country-Level
Income Inequality
-.05**
-.05**
-.04**
-.04**
-.05**
-.05**
(.02)
(.02)
(.02)
(.02)
(.02)
(.02)
Observations
41221
41221
41221
41221
41221
41221
Country-Year
54
54
54
54
54
54
2
Wald Chi
7521.04 7564.39 7517.91
7561.94
7521.04
7556.20
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 (Standard errors). Multilevel ordered logit coefficients.
Note: Results in Table B2 show that the findings in Chapter 3 are robust to other measures of
governance quality, including WGI measures of Rule of Law, Voice and Accountability, and
Government Effectiveness.
DV: How much trust do you have in the national government? 1=none to 4=a lot.
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Appendix C: Chapter 4 Experimental Design, Sample Characteristics, and Additional
Information

Table C1. Sample Characteristics
Full
Manipulation
40.93
39.60
Age
5.40
5.52
Ideology
2.30
2.65
Class
3.95
Education 3.92
.49
.45
Female
.31
.31
Partisan

Control
39.34
5.53
2.67
4.02
.52
.35

Treat 1
40.87
5.65
2.74
3.96
.41
.31

Treat 2
40.55
5.53
2.67
3.97
.37
.29

Treat 3
38.87
5.44
2.57
3.88
.46
.35

Note: This table shows the mean value for a variety of variables in the full sample (N=1,485),
compared to the subsample who answered the manipulation check correctly (N=651), and each of
the treatment and control groups who answered the manipulation check correctly. As Table C2
shows, none of these variables predict placement in the control or treatment group, whether
among the full sample or among the manipulation check subsample (with the exception of sex in
one instance).

Table C2. Multinomial Logit Predicting Treatment
T1
T2
T3
T1
T2
T3
Full
Full
Full
Manipulation Manipulation Manipulation
Ideology
.02
-.04
-.06
.02
-.00
-.01
(.04)
(.04)
(.04)
(.06)
(.06)
(.06)
Class
.07
.19
-.01
.07
-.07
-.26
(.13)
(.13)
(.13)
(.20)
(.19)
(.19)
Education
-.13
-.04
-.08
-.12
-.04
-.10
(.10)
(.10)
(.10)
(.14)
(.14)
(.14)
Female
-.19
-.24
-.16
-.47
-.72**
-.39
(.17)
(.17)
(.17)
(.25)
(.24)
(.24)
Political
.09
.04
-.03
.07
-.05
-.12
Interest
(.10)
(.10)
(.10)
(.15)
(.14)
(.15)
Partisan
-.30
-.29
-.13
-.20
-.26
.07
(.20)
(.20)
(.20)
(.27)
(.26)
(.26)
Age
.01
.01
.01
.00
.00
-.00
(.01)
(.01)
(.01)
(.01)
(.01)
(.01)
Observations
1146
572
Log
19.5
19.5
Likelihood
Note: Multinomial Logit Coefficients, Control group is the base category. With the exception of
women in the manipulation check subsample being more likely to be assigned to T2 (Inequality +
Unfair) compared to the control, none of the other variables predicts placement in treatment
groups in either sample.

Table C.3 Average Treatment Effects, Satisfaction with Democracy, Full Sample
Control
ATE=2.80
N=281
Inequality
Inequality + Unfair
Inequality + Fair
ATE=2.57
ATE=2.63
ATE=2.59
N=297
N=307
N=295
Diff= -.23**
Diff= -.17*
Diff= -.21**
Note: Two-tailed t-tests comparing each treatment to the control group *p<.10, **p<.05,
***p<.01
DV: How satisfied are you with the way democracy works in Argentina? 1=Very dissatisfied to
5=Very satisfied
Average treatment effects for the “Inequality” and “Inequality + Unfair” compared to the control
group are generally consistent with those from the subsample that answered the manipulation
check question correctly. However, participants in the full sample appear less likely to have
successfully received the “Inequality + Fair” treatment.
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Table C4. Inequality, Fairness Frames, & Satisfaction with Democracy
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Treatment 1 (Inequality)
-.26*
-.30*
-.21
(.13)
(.13)
(.38)
Treatment 2 (Ineq.+ Unfair)
-.23
-.26*
-.28
(.13)
(.12)
(.37)
Treatment 3 (Ineq. + Fair)
-.18
-.16
-.36
(.13)
(.13)
(.36)
Political Ideology (0=Left to 10=Right)
.12***
.12**
(.02)
(.04)
Treatment 1 X Ideology
-.02
(.06)
Treatment 2 X Ideology
.00
(.06)
Treatment 3 X Ideology
.04
(.06)
Subjective Social Class
.25***
.25***
(.07)
(.07)
Treatment 1 X Class
Treatment 2 X Class
Treatment 3 X Class
Female
Political Interest
Education
Role of the State
Constant
Observations
R2

2.85***
(.09)
584
.01

.06
(.09)
.01
(.05)
-.05
(.05)
-.08*
(.04)
2.05***
(.41)
576
.11

.06
(.09)
.01
(.05)
-.05
(.05)
-.08*
(.04)
2.10***
(.46)
576
.11

Model 4
-.83
(.58)
-1.29*
(.52)
-.77
(.53)
.12***
(.02)

.04
(.14)
.20
(.21)
.39*
(.19)
.23
(.20)
.06
(.09)
.01
(.05)
-.05
(.05)
-.08*
(.04)
2.58***
(.53)
576
.12

* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 (standard errors) OLS regression coefficients. Control group
excluded as reference category.
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Experimental Setup, United States
Participants began by answering two pre-treatment questions meant to measure their
perceptions of economic inequality and their perceptions of distributive unfairness in the
United States. The question about inequality perceptions asked whether the gap between
the rich and the poor in the United States had gotten “much smaller” (coded 1), “smaller”
(2), “about the same” (3), “bigger” (4), or “much bigger” (5) in the last 20 years. The
question about perceived distributive unfairness asked whether the income distribution in
the United States was “very fair” (coded 1), “fair” (2), “unfair” (3), or “very unfair” (4).
Next, I randomly assigned each of the 1,500 survey participants to receive one of three
experimental treatments, or to be in the control group. 28 Specifically, each participant
was randomly assigned to read one of the following vignettes:
“In 2008, the United States experienced the most severe economic crisis since the Great
Depression. Today, both the stock market and the unemployment rate are back to prerecession levels…”
Control: No sentence
Treatment 1 (Inequality Information): Still, many Americans’ economic situations
have actually gotten worse. According to recent figures, the gap between the richest 5%
and the poorest 25% is more than 6 times larger than it was before the recession.
Treatment 2: (Inequality + Unfair Outcome): Still, many Americans’ economic
situations have actually gotten worse. According to recent figures, the gap between the
richest 5% and the poorest 25% is more than 6 times larger than it was before the
recession. An independent economic think-tank explained, it is fundamentally unfair that
the recovery has disproportionately benefitted the wealthiest Americans. 29
Treatment 3: (Inequality + Fair Outcome): Still, many Americans’ economic
situations have actually gotten worse. According to recent figures, the gap between the
richest 5% and the poorest 25% is more than 6 times larger than it was before the
recession. An independent economic think-tank explained, it is fundamentally fair that
economic recoveries benefit some groups more than others, because that’s just the nature
of capitalism.
After reading one of the above vignettes, each participant was asked to indicate their trust
in the federal government: “How often can you trust the federal government in
Washington to do what is right? Never (coded 1), Some of the time (2), About half the
time (3), Most of the time (4), Always (5)?”

28 I used the “question randomization” option in Qualtrics to randomly assign
participants to treatments or the control group.
29 Emphasis added – not italicized in the original vignette.
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Table C5. Ordered Logit Predicting Trust in the Government, U.S. Experiment
Model 1
-.49***
(.15)
-.43**
(.15)
-.23
(.15)
.02
(.05)

T1: Inequality Information
T2: Inequality Information + Unfair
T3: Inequality Information + Fair
Political Ideology (Very Conservative=5)
T1: Inequality X Ideology
T2: Inequality + Unfair X Ideology
T3: Inequality + Fair X Ideology
Female

-.07
(.11)
-.08^
(.04)
.42***
(.07)
-.41**
(.13)
.24***
(.07)
-.12*
(.06)
-1.57***
(.39)
1.06**
(.39)
2.64***
(.40)
4.99***
(.47)
1,339
1569

Education
Class Self-Identification
Race (White=1)
Political Interest
Economic Situation Worse
Cut 1
Cut 2
Cut 3
Cut 4
Observations
Log Likelihood

Model 2
-.48
(.40)
-.67^
(.38)
-1.04**
(.40)
-.07
(.09)
-.01
(.13)
.08
(.12)
.28*
(.13)
-.05
(.11)
-.08^
(.04)
.43***
(.07)
-.43**
(.13)
.23***
(.07)
-.12*
(.06)
-1.83***
(.44)
.81^
(.44)
2.40***
(.45)
4.75***
(.52)
1,339
1566

*** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.10, Standard errors in parentheses.
Ordered logit coefficients, DV (1-5, 5= “Always” Trust). Control group excluded as the reference
category.
Consistent with the results in Table 2, treatments 1 and 2 are associated with significantly lower
levels of trust, compared to the control group, whereas treatment 3 is not.
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Experimental Setup, Mexico
Participants were randomly assigned to read some version of the following vignette:
Control: La economía en México creció 2.3 por ciento en 2017.
T1: La economía en México creció 2.3 por ciento en 2017. A pesar del reciente
crecimiento económico, la diferencia de ingresos entre ricos y pobres ha aumentado en
México.
T2. La economía en México creció 2.3 por ciento en 2017. A pesar del reciente
crecimiento económico, la diferencia de ingresos entre ricos y pobres ha aumentado en
México. Según una organización independiente y sin fines de lucro, el aumento en la
desigualdad de ingresos es un resultado injusto del crecimiento económico.
T3: La economía en México creció 2.3 por ciento en 2017. A pesar del reciente
crecimiento económico, la diferencia de ingresos entre ricos y pobres ha aumentado en
México. Según una organización independiente y sin fines de lucro, el aumento en la
desigualdad de ingresos es un resultado justo del crecimiento económico.
Teniendo esto en cuenta, mire esta escala y dígame, cuánta confianza tiene usted en el
Gobierno Nacional: mucha (1), algo (2), poco (3), o ninguna (4)
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APPENDIX D: Chapter 5 Experimental Design and Sample Characteristics

Table D1. Sample Characteristics
Full
Manip
40.93 40.67
Age
5.40
5.36
Ideology
2.60
2.56
Class
3.92
3.89
Education
.50
.54
Female
.31
.30
Partisan

T1
40.44
5.33
2.54
3.90
.53
.24

T2
37.98
5.34
2.53
3.85
.49
.18

T3
37.58
4.50
2.42
3.83
.53
.30

T4
47.82
6.46
2.82
4.13
.58
.41

T5
39.25
4.94
2.46
3.77
.57
.28

T6
43.03
6.04
2.67
3.94
.52
.39

Note: This table shows the mean value for a variety of variables in the full sample (N=1,577),
compared to the subsample who answered the manipulation check correctly (N=624), and each of
the treatment and control groups who answered the manipulation check correctly. In Appendix
Tables D6 and D7 I use these participant characteristics to predict assignment to treatment
groups.

Table D2. Experimental Vignettes
Treatment 1: En años recientes, la prestación de servicios públicos en la Argentina
ha permanecido igual, mientras que el uso de recursos públicos para
Theft Same
fines indebidos por funcionarios del gobierno ha permanecido
igual. Al mismo tiempo, la brecha en la distribución del ingreso entre
ricos y pobres en la Argentina ha continuado creciendo.
Treatment 2: Según analistas independientes, el numero de funcionarios del
Bribes Same gobierno que acepten las coimas ha permanecido igual en los
últimos años. Al mismo tiempo, la brecha en la distribución del
ingreso entre ricos y pobres en la Argentina ha continuado creciendo.
Treatment 3: En años recientes, la prestación de servicios públicos en la Argentina
ha empeorado, mientras que el uso de recursos públicos para fines
Theft
indebidos por funcionarios del gobierno ha ido en aumento.
Increasing
Además de estas deficiencias, la brecha en la distribución del ingreso
entre ricos y pobres en la Argentina ha continuado creciendo.
Treatment 4: En años recientes, la prestación de servicios públicos en la Argentina
ha mejorado, mientras que el uso de recursos públicos para fines
Theft
indebidos por funcionarios del gobierno ha declinado. A pesar de
Decreasing
estos progresos, la brecha en la distribución del ingreso entre ricos y
pobres en la Argentina ha continuado creciendo.
Treatment 5: Según analistas independientes, el numero de funcionarios del
Bribes
gobierno que acepten las coimas ha aumentado en los últimos
años. Además de estas deficiencias, la brecha en la distribución del
Increasing
ingreso entre ricos y pobres en la Argentina ha continuado
creciendo.
Treatment 6: Según analistas independientes, el numero de funcionarios del
Bribes
gobierno que acepten las coimas ha disminuido en los últimos
años. A pesar de estos progresos, la brecha en la distribución del
Decreasing
ingreso entre ricos y pobres en la Argentina ha continuado
creciendo.
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Table D3. Average Treatment Effects, Perceived Unfairness, Full Sample
Theft of Resources
Same
Increasing
Decreasing
ATE=3.27
ATE=3.20
ATE=3.34
N=280
N=248
N=297
Diff= -.07
Diff= .06
Bribery
Same
Increasing
Decreasing
ATE=3.26
ATE=3.31
ATE=3.31
N=235
N=259
N=254
Diff= .05
Diff=.05
Note: Two-tailed T-tests comparing the corruption “increasing” and “decreasing” treatments to
the “same” treatment, “*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01.
DV: Perceived fairness of income distribution 1= “Very Fair” to 4= “Very Unfair”

Table D4. Average Treatment Effects, Satisfaction, Full Sample
Theft of Resources
Same
Increasing
ATE=2.50
ATE=2.60
N=280
N=248
Diff= .10
Bribery
Same
Increasing
ATE=2.35
ATE=2.50
N=235
N=259
Diff= .15*

Decreasing
ATE=2.52
N=297
Diff= .02
Decreasing
ATE=2.54
N=254
Diff=.19**

Note: Two-tailed T-tests comparing the corruption “increasing” and “decreasing” treatments to
the “same” treatment, “*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01.
DV: Satisfaction with democracy 1= “Very Dissatisfied” to 5= “Very satisfied”

Table D5. Average Treatment Effects, Trust, Full Sample
Theft of Resources
Same
Increasing
ATE=2.15
ATE=2.18
N=280
N=248
Diff= .03
Bribery
Same
Increasing
ATE=2.10
ATE=2.19
N=235
N=259
Diff= .09

Decreasing
ATE=2.18
N=297
Diff= .03
Decreasing
ATE=2.14
N=254
Diff= .04

Note: Two-tailed T-tests comparing the corruption “increasing” and “decreasing” treatments to
the “same” treatment, “*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01.
DV: Trust in the national government 1= “Very Fair” to 4= “Very Unfair”
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Table D6. Multinomial Logit Predicting Treatment, Full Sample
T2
T3
T4
Ideology
.01
-.04
.03
(.05)
(.05)
(.04)
Class
-.02
.05
.03
(.13)
(.13)
(.13)
Education
-.04
-.01
.05
(.11)
(.10)
(.10)
Female
-.19
-.14
.10
(.18)
(.18)
(.17)
Political Interest
-.09
-.20
-.18
(.11)
(.10)
(.10)
Partisan
.05
-.04
-.02
(.21)
(.21)
(.20)
Age
-.00
-.00
.00
(.01)
(.01)
(.01)
Observations
1540
Log Likelihood
-2739.29

T5
.01
(.05)
-.05
(.13)
.03
(.10)
-.10
(.18)
-.05
(.10)
-.03
(.20)
-.00
(.01)

T6
.00
(.05)
-.10
(.13)
-.03
(.10)
-.08
(.18)
-.33**
(.10)
.40*
(.20)
-.01
(.01)

Table D7. Multinomial Logit Predicting Treatment, Manipulation Check
T2
T3
T4
T5
T6
Ideology
.01
-.25**
.25**
-.11
.16
(.08)
(.08)
(.08)
(.08)
(.08)
Class
.02
-.14
.38
-.11
.21
(.22)
(.21)
(.25)
(.20)
(.23)
Education
.01
.01
.17
-.12
.03
(.17)
(.17)
(.18)
(.16)
(.17)
Female
-.25
-.08
.31
.12
-.05
(.30)
(.29)
(.32)
(.28)
(.30)
Political Interest
-.17
-.30
-.14
-.01
-.44*
(.18)
(.17)
(.19)
(.16)
(.18)
Partisan
-.19
.50
.68
.24
.87*
(.38)
(.34)
(.36)
(.33)
(.35)
Age
-.01
-.01
.03*
-.00
.01
(.01)
(.01)
(.01)
(.01)
(.01)
Observations
609
Log Likelihood
-1021.19
Multinomial logit coefficients, “theft same” treatment is the base category. Generally
speaking, none of these participant characteristics predict assignment to treatment groups.
In both the full and reduced sample, politically interested individuals are slightly less
likely to be assigned to the “bribery decreasing” treatment, compared to the “theft same”
treatment. Those who identify with a political party are slightly more likely to be
assigned to the “bribery decreasing treatment.” Political ideology also predicts
assignment to Treatments 3 and 4 (compared to Treatment 1) in the reduced sample.
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